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T HE most lively debate in corporate law today concerns take-
overs. There are two important questions. The first is whether
takeovers, or efforts to prevent them, are in the interest of share-
holders. This has implications for the second issue-whether, and
to what extent, the states and the national government should reg-
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ulate offers and defenses. This article seeks to shed light on both
of these questions by examining the actions of states and firms in
the takeover game.
The national government's preeminent, albeit controversial, role
in takeovers was legislated by Congress with the Williams Act,'
which establishes the ground rules for tender offers. State legisla-
tures, however, have often intervened in the takeover process,
stretching the fundamental requirements of the Williams Act, for
the most part at the expense of bidders. Although the Supreme
Court sought to stem the states' efforts at broad regulation when it
held in Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 that Illinois' takeover statute bur-
dened interstate commerce, states, within months of the decision,
fashioned new takeover legislation. To add to the statutory and
jurisdictional complexity, when bidders and target firms have en-
gaged in extensive legal maneuvering, federal and state courts,
more often than not, have been passive bystanders to the battles.3
The result has been unsettled case law and a barrage of complaints
by commentators, practitioners, and legislators. Not surprisingly,
there has been a flurry of proposals for an even greater federal reg-
ulatory role.4 Although the SEC has expressed disagreement with
several state court decisions and has begun the process of over-
turning them by regulation, it has forcefully opposed suggestions
to displace fully the authority of the states.5
This article takes two distinct approaches in analyzing the take-
over debate. After describing the three archetypal second genera-
tion state takeover statutes, I examine in depth the politics behind
the enactment of such a statute in Connecticut. As I reside there,
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982).
2 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
3 See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
" Even the Federal Reserve Board has gotten into the action. The Board proposed to
apply its margin requirements to takeover bids financed by junk bonds, although the Rea-
gan appointees dissented. Changing the Rules: Attacking Junk Bonds, Fed Becomes a
Player in the Takeover Game, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
5 See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 23,241 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873 (July 17, 1986) ("All Holders" rule, overruling Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (March 28, 1984) (Statement of John Shad, Chair-
man, SEC), reprinted in [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,511,
86,678; The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors 215 (1985).
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it had the advantage of geographical convenience, and the experi-
ence of other states appears to be similar. I also draw some conclu-
sions from the legislative process in Connecticut as to why Dela-
ware, the most favored incorporation state, may be better situated
to evaluate more soberly, if not to resist, the enactment of a take-
over law. My hope is that a micro explanation of the politics that
produce such corporation laws will generate insights for policymak-
ers concerning the appropriateness of state regulation of takeovers.
The second approach taken by this article originates in the puz-
zle of why there is a need for legislation in the first place. Because
takeover statutes codify defensive tactics that firms adopt by char-
ter amendment, self-help would appear to be an equally feasible
course of action. To investigate this question, I map out a share-
holder's decision concerning how to respond to a tender offer in
the presence of different antitakeover rules. I then suggest that the
usual presumption that a firm's shareholders have identical inter-
ests is inappropriate in this context due to differences in informa-
tion costs among shareholders. I accordingly offer an explanation
keyed to the firm's ownership composition for when a firm will
adopt shark repellent charter amendments. One implication is that
a statute, under specified conditions, can enable a firm's managers
to obtain protection comparable to a charter provision that would
not have been adopted by a shareholder vote. The statutes are
therefore troublesome, for they can produce results that are incon-
sistent with the core goal of corporation law-the maximization of
equity share prices. A further implication of the analysis is an ex-
planation for why the most popular shark repellent amendment
and second generation takeover statute is a fair price provision.
I. SECOND GENERATION TAKEOVER STATUTES
A. The Aftermath of Edgar v. MITE Corp.
The popularity of takeover regulation is impressive. First gener-
ation takeover statutes were enacted across the states at a quicker
pace than all other innovations in corporation codes in recent his-
tory.e In 1982, the year MITE was decided, thirty-seven states had
takeover statutes. Moreover, the MITE decision has done little to
' See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. Law,
Econ. & Organization 225, 234 (figure 1) (1985).
1987]
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abate interest in the regulation of takeovers. Within four years of
the decision, new takeover laws have been adopted in twenty-one
states. Not surprisingly, a state's adoption of a second generation
statute is strongly correlated with its having had a first generation
statute.'
These second generation takeover laws have been shaped to cir-
cumvent the problems of the Illinois statute struck down in MITE.
That statute had both substantive and jurisdictional flaws. It cre-
ated a waiting period before an offer could be initiated, a restric-
tion that went well beyond the requirements of the Williams Act,
and enabled Illinois to further delay a bid through an administra-
tive hearing on the fairness of the offer and the adequacy of disclo-
sure.' In addition, the statute had a broad jurisdictional reach,
such that a bid subject to the Illinois law could also be subject to
regulation by numerous other states. 9
The second generation statutes share characteristics that distin-
guish them from the Illinois statute.10 The jurisdictional nexus has
The Spearman rank correlation for adoption of both a first and second generation stat-
ute in which the states are ranked by the order of the date of enactment of the statutes was
0.4313, which is significant at the .005 level for a one-tailed test (t = 3.31).
8 Illinois subjected takeovers to a state regulatory process that delayed the commence-
ment of a bid by requiring a 20-day registration period during which the state could initiate
a hearing on the bid's fairness and the adequacy of the bidder's disclosure. See Illinois Busi-
ness Takeover Act §§ 4(E), 7(E), 1978 Ill. Laws 1581, 1586-87 (repealed). No shares could be
acquired before the registration period expired or the hearing had terminated. The Williams
Act has no waiting period, but it does require bidders to allow shareholders who tender their
shares to withdraw them during an initial period, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982), which, at the
time of the MITE decision, was the first seven days of the offer. This has the effect of
delaying the finalization of an offer for the duration of the withdrawal period.
9 The statute covered a target firm if 10% of the shareholders were located in Illinois or if
two of the following three conditions were satisfied: the target's principal executive office
was in Illinois; it was organized under Illinois law; or 10% of its stated capital and paid-in
surplus were represented within the state. Illinois Business Takeover Act § 2.10, 1978 Ill.
Laws 1581, 1583-84 (repealed).
10 A number of states chose to modify their takeover statutes after MITE by narrowing
the jurisdictional base and by tinkering with or eliminating the registration and hearing
requirements for publicly traded corporations. Tighter jurisdictional requirements include
application to firms with a specified number of resident shareholders and assets in the state.
See, e.g., Oklahoma Take-over Disclosure Act of 1985, § 2, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 452
(West Supp. 1987) (20% Oklahoma shareholders and substantial assets in state). In some
states, hearing and preregistration requirements are retained only for firms that are not
covered by federal law. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Supp. 1986). In other states, administra-
tive review of a bid must be completed before the expiration of the Williams Act's minimum
offering and withdrawal rights periods. See, e.g., Oklahoma Take-over Disclosure Act of
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been tightened: conforming with the traditional choice of law rule
in corporate law, the statutes apply only to domestically-incorpo-
rated firms. In addition, the substantive features are less burden-
some on interstate commerce. Where a statute requires approval of
a transaction, it is only the firm's shareholders, not a state agency,
whose decision determines the outcome, and, in contrast with the
earlier statutes, firms may opt out of the new regulatory regimes.
But unlike the first generation takeover statutes, which were all
cut from the same cloth, the second generation statutes have three
distinct patterns. They are a striking example of extensive experi-
mentation by states in legal innovation. This variety may, however,
be induced by uncertainty regarding the scope of the constitutional
constraint imposed by MITE rather than by disagreement con-
cerning the most effective regulation. For although MITE held the
most potent takeover statute unconstitutional, it did not hold that
the Williams Act preempted state regulation. The decision may
reasonably be understood as expressing greater concern over the
Illinois statute's broad jurisdictional reach than its substantive
content.
The initial second generation takeover statute was Ohio's control
share acquisition law,1' enacted only a few months after the MITE
decision. Under this provision, a majority of disinterested share-
holders must approve the acquisition of control by any person.12 A
control share acquisition is defined as either the acquisition of at
least twenty percent of the firm's stock or an acquisition that in-
creases a person's holdings such that the shareholder moves from
one statutory range of voting power to another." Firms may ex-
empt themselves from the control share acquisition statute by a
1985, § 3(D)-(E), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 453 (West Supp. 1987). These changes probably
bring the statutes within constitutional requirements, but they also strip them of their most
potent weapon, their effectiveness at delaying a bid. Because the success of a bid is a func-
tion of the offer price, which must be pitched to market conditions, the timing of the bid is
critical. Even a brief delay can misprice an offer and thereby increase the likelihood of a
bid's defeat. Moreover, delay increases the probability that a competing bidder with lower
acquisition costs will enter either because it can free ride on information concerning the
target's value revealed by the original bid or because it is aided by target management seek-
ing a friendlier suitor.
" Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985).
" All of the statutes include entities in the definition of a person. See, e.g., id. § 1701.01
(G).
.3 Id. § 1701.01(Z). The ranges of voting power are one-fifth to less than one-third; one-
third to less than a majority; a majority or more. Id.
1987]
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corporate charter or bylaw amendment. A sympathetic view of the
statute's approval requirement is that by partially conforming
stock purchases to the existing requirements for asset purchases or
mergers, it moves the corporation code in the direction of treating
different modes of acquisitions uniformly.
The second type of regulation to be adopted was Maryland's fair
price provision.14 Directed against front-end loaded, two-tier acqui-
sitions, this statute codified one of the most common shark repel-
lent charter amendments. When a firm engages in a business com-
bination with a person owning ten percent of the firm's stock, a
supermajority vote of the shareholders (eighty percent of the total
outstanding stock plus two-thirds of the disinterested shares) is re-
quired for approval unless certain conditions are met.15 The ex-
empting provisions require either the approval of a disinterested
board of directors, which in essence is the board as constituted
prior to the interested shareholder's acquisition of ten percent, or
the payment of a fair price, which is, for the most part, the higher
of any price the interested party paid to obtain its shares or the
market price at the time of the combination. Firms can opt out of
the fair price statute by board resolution within two months of the
statute's effective date, or at any time by a supermajority share-
holder vote. Like the Ohio control share acquisition statute, one
effect of this provision is to blur the statutory distinctions between
takeover bids and mergers or asset sales by subjecting more corpo-
rate acquisitions to board or shareholder approval. Yet unlike the
control share acquisition statute, Maryland's fair price approach
strengthens incumbent management's bargaining position because,
to the extent that obtaining board approval is cheaper than meet-
ing either the fair price or supermajority vote requirements, bid-
ders' incentives to make side payments to management are
increased.
The third pattern is the redemption rights statute enacted by
Pennsylvania approximately a year after Ohio's control share ac-
quisition statute was passed.1 6 Upon a person's acquisition of
14 Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
15 Business combinations are broadly defined to include mergers, consolidations, share
exchanges, asset sales, leases or transfers, stock issuances equal to five percent of the out-
standing stock market value, liquidations, dissolutions, reclassifications of securities, and
recapitalizations. Id. at § 3-601(e).
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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thirty percent of a firm's stock, all of the remaining shareholders
are entitled to receive, on demand, from the acquirer an amount in
cash equal to the fair value of the stock, including the proportional
increment payable as a control premium. A corporation can opt
out of the redemption rights requirement by a board resolution
adopted within ninety days of the statute's effective date, or at any
time by charter amendment. The effect of the statute is to convert
partial offers into any-or-all offers. It can also be characterized as a
move to more uniform treatment of acquisitions, in that it extends
appraisal rights, which are generally accorded in mergers and asset
sales, to sales of stock.
B. Why Is the Fair Price Approach So Popular?
Of the three paradigmatic second generation takeover statutes,
the Maryland fair price provision has been the most popular with
other states. Within three years after the enactment of the Mary-
land statute, thirteen more states added a fair price provision to
their corporation codes, 17 while only five copied the Ohio control
share acquisition legislation.'8 The figures double count Indiana
" The states with fair price statutes are: Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-374a
to -374c (West Supp. 1986); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-2-232 to -234 (Supp. 1986); Illi-
nois, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. §
23-1-43 (Burns Supp. 1986); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 271A.396-.398 (Baldwin
1986); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12:132-134 (West Supp. 1986); Maryland, Md.
Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 and Supp. 1986); Michigan, Mich. Comp.
Laws. Ann. §§ 450.1776-.1784 (West Supp. 1986); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 79-25-1 to
-7 (Supp. 1986); New Jersey, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 74 (West); New York, N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney 1986); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (1985);
Washington, Wash. Rev. Code § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1986); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. §
180.725 (West Supp. 1987). The most recent variations of this type of takeover statute,
passed by Indiana, New York, and New Jersey, refine the Maryland approach to impose
greater restrictions on bids. They prohibit business combinations with interested sharehold-
ers for five years after the acquisition of the interest, with only few exceptions, and the
approval of a majority of disinterested shares is required for combinations after the five-
year waiting period.
IS The states with control share acquisition statutes are: Hawaii, Haw. Rev Stat. § 416-
171 to -172 (Supp. 1986); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-42 (Burns Supp. 1986); Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987) (amended 1985); Missouri, Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1986); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.831 (Anderson
1985); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1986). Again, the more recent
enactments, such as the Indiana statute, refine the original statute. The acquisition of con-
trol shares itself is not subject to disinterested shareholders' approval, but those shares'
voting rights must be approved.
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and Wisconsin, which enacted both fair price and control share ac-
quisition statutes. The least popular approach, followed by only
two states, is Pennsylvania's redemption rights statute.19
The popularity of the fair price statute is a function of several
factors. Of the three types of takeover laws, a fair price statute is
the least restrictive of takeovers because it applies only to the sec-
ond stage of a two-tier offer. Hence, the object of regulation is the
most distinct from that of the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE.
Part of the impetus for adoption of this approach in other states,
such as Connecticut, appears to be the Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral's issuance of an opinion that the statute is constitutional. 0
Concern over the constitutionality of other approaches is well-
founded. Control share acquisition statutes have uniformly been
held unconstitutional.21 These decisions have had repercussions:
the invalidation of Minnesota's control share acquisition provi-
sion, 2 for example, prompted Wisconsin to adopt a new statute.2 3
It is therefore reasonable for a cautious or cost-conserving legisla-
ture to choose a fair price statute over the other two possibilities.
In addition, a fair price statute is easier to justify than the other
provisions as being in the interest of shareholders. A longstanding
contention advanced by distinguished corporate law scholars is
that two-tier offers coerce shareholders to tender at a price lower
i' The states with redemption rights statutes are: Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, §
910 (Supp. 1986); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986); Utah,
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-76.5 (Supp. 1986).
20 The decision ruling Maryland's first generation takeover statute unconstitutional,
which arose from the highly publicized takeover battle between Bendix and Martin Mari-
etta, Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982), was in the
minds of local corporations and legislators when Maryland's fair price statute was enacted,
see Dept. of Legislative Reference, Staff Report to the General Assembly of Maryland on
Corporations and Associations: Consideration of the Problem of Special Voting Require-
ments in Consolidations, Mergers, Takeovers, and Transfers of Assets, Extraordinary Sess.,
June 1983, at 9, and the Attorney General's opinion on the proposed statute's constitution-
ality was requested, id. at 65-72.
21 See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (Ohio);
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (Indiana); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw.
1986) (Hawaii).
22 APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn 1985).
23 See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1986). The statute, similar to Indiana's
control share acquisition statute, reduces the voting power of anyone holding 20% or more
of a firm's stock to 10%, unless a majority of the shareholders vote to restore the shares'
voting rights.
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than that which they believe their shares to be worth.2 4 Commen-
tators maintain that shareholders are pressured to tender in the
first step because they fear they will receive an even lower price for
their shares in the second step, a merger in which the bidder, now
the controlling shareholder, is able to set the terms. To eliminate
this whipsaw effect, commentators have supported a guarantee of
the same price in both steps, 25 one of the alternative conditions for
a business combination in the Maryland statute. Recognition of a
need for equal treatment among shareholders makes a fair price
statute appealing; the concern for preventing allegedly coercive
tenders is ammunition for refuting the contention that the legisla-
tion is principally a device to entrench poorly performing managers
by discouraging takeovers.
The most compelling explanation for the popularity of the fair
price statute, however, is that it provides more firms with what
they want. The pattern of voluntary adoptions of shark repellent
amendments is a reasonable proxy for firm preferences. I examined
the charters of two sets of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
firms-the 293 firms incorporated in the fourteen states that had
enacted second generation statutes at the time the research for this
article was initiated, and a random sample of 200 firms incorpo-
rated in the remaining thirty-six states. Of the three statutory var-
iations, the fair price provision was adopted by more corporations:
109 (twenty-two percent) had a fair price provision in their char-
ter. By contrast, only nine had a redemption rights guarantee and
two a control share acquisition provision, and both of these two
were adopted to conform the firms' charters to the Ohio statute. 6
Perhaps even more telling evidence of firms' preference for a fair
price provision is that eight of the fourteen Pennsylvania corpora-
tions with fair price provisions adopted them after the enactment
of Pennsylvania's redemption rights statute, whereas no firms in
U See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 297, 336-37 (1974). But see Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider
Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42 (1980).
25 See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 337.
16 A recent study by the SEC corroborates the point. The study found that fair price
provisions predominate over all other types of shark repellent amendments. See Office of
the Chief Economist of the SEC, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of An-
titakeover Amendments Since 1980, at 4 (1985) [hereinafter SEC, Shark Repellent Amend-
ment Study] (75% of 649 shark repellent amendments were fair price provisions).
1987]
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states with a fair price statute added a redemption rights provision
to their charters. Moreover, nine firms opted out of Pennsylvania's
redemption rights statute and two opted out of Ohio's control
share acquisition statute, but I did not find any firms opting out of
a fair price regime. In short, a state legislature seeking to enact a
takeover statute that most closely tracks its corporate constituents'
desires would choose Maryland's fair price approach.
The frequency with which firms adopt fair price provisions sug-
gests a transaction cost explanation for the rapid diffusion of the
fair price statute. If corporations desire a specific provision in their
charter, it reduces their costs if corporation laws codify the provi-
sion, because the firm's participants will not have to incur the ex-
pense of bargaining over inclusion of the clause. This is an expla-
nation that views corporation codes as standard form contracts,
which firms can tailor to better fit their affairs.
But a transaction cost explanation for second generation statutes
is not especially persuasive. While fair price provisions are by far
the most prevalent shark repellent amendment, less than one-
quarter of the firms in my sample had such provisions. If the ab-
sence of a fair price provision signals that the owners believe that
such a provision is not in their interest, a statutory presumption of
a fair price rule imposes costs on these firms because they will
have to take affirmative steps to opt out of the rule. Yet a certifi-
cate's silence may be ambiguous. Some firms may desire fair price
protection but be unwilling to act openly and thereby attract the
attention of bidders. Hence, a transaction cost explanation cannot
be evaluated in the abstract. The discussion that follows seeks to
provide information on the politics behind the passage of these
laws and on firms' self-help decisions-information that is needed
to reach an informed judgment on the merits of the new statutes.
II. THE MAKING OF A TAKEOVER STATUTE
A. A Coalition Explanation of Takeover Legislation
I undertook the research for this article in order to explore the
conjecture that takeover statutes are supported by a broad coali-
tion of interest groups that include, in addition to target corpora-
2 For a cogent statement of this explanation of corporation law, see R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 369-72 (3d ed. 1986).
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tions and their management, organized labor and community
groups who have no interest in the everyday making of corporation
codes. I derived this scenario from reports in the business press
that intimated that such a coalition was possible.
For instance, when the Gulf Corporation was acquired by the
Standard Oil Company of California, press accounts emphasized
the fear in Pittsburgh that the local economy would be adversely
affected if Gulf's corporate headquarters were transferred after the
control change. 28 This fear arose because three percent of the do-
nations to the local United Way ($700,000) came from Gulf and its
employees; a local messenger service stood to lose ten percent of its
local billings ($150,000); and Allegheny County faced the loss of $2
million in personal and corporate property taxes.2 9 Further, Gulf
contributed $2 million to an estimated fifty Pittsburgh charitable
institutions in the year prior to its acquisition, and intangible
losses could be projected because some of the city's most active
civic leaders were Gulf executives.3s I thought that the Pittsburgh
story would be representative and that unions and community
groups, because of their concern over the deleterious impact of a
control transfer on the local social and economic equilibrium,
would easily be mobilized to support laws regulating takeovers. My
conjecture was that such concerns would be most prevalent in
states with higher unemployment or slower economic growth, like
Pennsylvania, than in more prosperous regions, where the reloca-
tion of one firm would have no perceptible effect on a vibrant local
economy.
The significance of a coalition explanation of takeover regulation
for corporate law is its connection to the central debate over who
benefits-managers or shareholders-from the competition among
" See Gulf's Departing Pittsburgh Would Deal a Harsh Blow to City's Economy and
Pride, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 33, col. 3 [hereinafter Gulfs Departing]; see also What
Merger Mania Did to Syracuse, Fortune, Feb. 3, 1986, at 94 [hereinafter Syracuse Merger
Mania] (discussing similar concerns in Syracuse and finding that takeover did not cause the
problem feared).
" Gulf's Departing, supra note 28. For analogous information on Syracuse, see Syracuse
Merger Mania, supra note 28, at 94-98.
3' Gulf executives served on the boards of local hospitals, schools, churches, and civic
organizations, as well as the boards of local businesses. Gulf's Departing, supra note 28. See
also Merger Fever Affecting Corporate Philanthropy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1986, at A19, col.
1 (describing nonprofit organizations' perceptions that mergers change firms' philanthropic
patterns).
1987]
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states for the corporate charter business. The coalition explanation
could resolve, at least indirectly, a puzzle identified in an earlier
article of mine on state competition: one of the features of corpora-
tion codes that attracts firms is the facilitation of antitakeover de-
fensive tactics.3 1 This finding creates serious difficulties for the po-
sition espoused by several scholars that state competition produces
corporation codes that maximize shareholder welfare but that
management efforts to thwart tender offers are at odds with share-
holders' interests. The appearance of an unusually broad coalition
supporting a corporate law provision would provide indirect evi-
dence that the law did not serve the interest of shareholders in a
context where shareholders' and managers' interests may diverge.
The thesis is that managers are better positioned to secure the en-
actment of legislation that shareholders do not desire when manag-
ers can align themselves with interest groups outside the share-
holder-manager nexus. This is an intuitively appealing
explanation, because even if the overwhelming majority of corpora-
tion code provisions are beneficial to shareholders, some might not
be so. Namely, state takeover laws could be aberrational in their
politics.
B. The Politics of Connecticut's Second Generation Statute
In 1984, Connecticut adopted a second generation takeover stat-
ute that was modeled after the Maryland fair price legislation. The
statute requires business combinations with interested sharehold-
ers (ten percent owners) to be approved by supermajority vote
(eighty percent plus two-thirds disinterested shares) unless either
the transaction is approved by a disinterested board or the terms
of the combination equal essentially the higher of the highest price
the interested party paid for its shares or the current market
price." Although key features of the enactment of the statute dif-
fered from the adoption of other corporation law provisions, a sim-
ple version of the coalition explanation is an incorrect characteriza-
tion of the political dynamics. The spur behind the passage of the
Connecticut statute was not a broad-based political coalition.
Rather, the bill was promoted by a corporation incorporated in
11 See Romano, supra note 6, at 249-50.
32 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 73:111
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Connecticut, the Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company
(Aetna), which enlisted the support of the most important business
association in the state, the Connecticut Business and Industry As-
sociation (CBIA).33
1. The Legislation's Proponents
The political influence that a major corporation like Aetna could
have upon Connecticut's legislature is no surprise. Aetna is one of
eighteen NYSE corporations incorporated in Connecticut. Two
years before the enactment of the second generation takeover stat-
ute, it was second among the top one hundred publicly-traded
Connecticut companies ranked by sales, with assets valued at ap-
proximately $44 billion, sales of approximately $14 billion, and
profits of approximately $427 million.34 Although these facts of
themselves do not demonstrate that Aetna has political clout, they
suggest that its welfare would not go unnoticed by conscientious
state legislators. Moreover, the company is widely perceived to be
a "first class local corporate citizen. ' '3 5 The clear impression con-
veyed to me in conversations with individuals involved in the mak-
ing of Connecticut's second generation takeover statute is that, be-
cause of the conflux of these tangible and intangible assets, Aetna
has considerable influence in state politics.
Similarly, as the largest organization representing business firms
in the state, the CBIA would be expected to be influential in state
politics. It has a membership of over 6,000 Connecticut businesses,
33 Although Aetna did not cooperate in my study, I believe that I have sufficient informa-
tion to provide an accurate account of what occurred in Connecticut. When I started the
research for this article, I was told that Aetna had been involved in the legislation. After
several frustrating months of unsuccessful attempts to meet with members of Aetna's legal
staff who had worked on the bill, I concluded that they were not anxious to discuss the
matter with me, even though I assured them that their firm would not be identified in my
study. I then proceeded to collect information from other sources-interviews and telephone
conversations with legislators, lobbyists, and lawyers. After having obtained a good picture
of what had occurred, I contacted the individual in charge of Aetna's legal department.
Unlike his staff, he returned my call promptly, but he did not provide any information
beyond what I had already learned. He also refused to make available drafts of the bill that
was eventually enacted. I therefore decided to identify Aetna, since the firm neither facili-
tated my research nor provided me with any confidential information.
" The Top 100, Bus. Times, May 1983, at 4. For later years, the top 100 ranking has been
restricted to manufacturing firms, which excludes financial services firms like Aetna. See
The Top 100, Bus. Times, May 1984, at 4.
3' The Game of Clean Money, New England Monthly, Feb. 1986, at 56.
1987]
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  123 1987
Virginia Law Review
which includes both manufacturing and financial firms, and is es-
sentially a state chamber of commerce. Although approximately
eighty percent of the members are small firms with less than one
hundred employees, the major corporations in the state, including
Aetna, are represented on the managing board.
Like most trade associations, the CBIA engages in extensive lob-
bying. It is in fact the largest lobbying organization in Connecticut.
It has several registered lobbyists and is the perennial leader in
legislative lobbying expenditures. For example, in 1984, the year
the second generation takeover statute was enacted, the CBIA
spent slightly less than $250,000 on legislative lobbying. This dol-
lar amount might seem small, but in relative terms it is substan-
tial. The organization with the second highest level of expendi-
tures, a utility company, spent only slightly more than $70,000.6
Given its ability to allocate considerable funds for lobbying, the
CBIA is a force to be reckoned with in Connecticut politics.
Before actively promoting Aetna's takeover bill with legislators,
the CBIA leadership consulted some of its other members concern-
ing the merits of the draft legislation. There were no objections.
There is a straightforward explanation for this consensus: of the
largest Connecticut corporations that are most comparable to
Aetna and more likely to be affected by the statute-the other sev-
enteen firms listed on the NYSE-most would be untouched by
the proposal. Five of the firms already had similar fair price provi-
sions in their charters, and seven of the firms had a ten percent
shareholder and would therefore be exempt from the statute's cov-
erage.3 7 Moreover, only a few Connecticut corporations are active
acquirers that might have a different perspective than target firms
"I All figures are from Connecticut State Ethics Comm'n, Registered Lobbyists and their
Expenditures and Receipts as Reported to Connecticut State Ethics Commission for Calen-
dar Year 1984 (1985). The CBIA expenditure is approximately 31% of the total spent by the
top 10 lobbying organizations in the state.
A 10% shareholder exemption had been included in the Maryland statute that served
as the model for Connecticut at the urging of local corporations that otherwise opposed the
legislation. See infra note 72. In the 1985 legislative session Connecticut eliminated the 10%
shareholder exemption and all publicly traded Connecticut corporations were brought under
the fair price provision. 1985 Conn. Acts 85-283 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 33-374c (West Supp. 1986)). This bill was timely introduced and unanimously ap-
proved. No one testified at the scheduled hearing, although one attorney submitted a writ-
ten statement in favor of the proposal. The rumor is that a corporation with a block of stock
in unfriendly hands wanted to be covered by the statute to protect itself against any effort
of the owner of the block to acquire the firm.
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on takeover legislation. The absence of such a constituency in the
state surely helps to explain the general support for, or indiffer-
ence to, the statute within the business community.
But even if there had been more firms in Connecticut with an
aggressive merger and acquisition policy, it is not obvious that they
would have opposed Aetna's bill. For instance, one of the more
prominent acquisition-oriented firms headquartered in Connecti-
cut, United Technologies, has a fair price provision in its charter.3 s
In addition, even a firm that is an aggressive acquirer and not con-
cerned about becoming a target itself might not perceive a fair
price statute to be a problem. The firm may engage primarily in
friendly or one-tier acquisitions, or have little interest in acquiring
Connecticut corporations. In any event, there was no business con-
stitutency that was troubled by the proposed takeover legislation.
2. The Procedural Setting
One would surely expect the active involvement of major corpo-
rations and business organizations such as Aetna and the CBIA in
any important change in a state's corporation code. The politics of
Connecticut's fair price provision fits that intuition. Still, the en-
actment of the takeover provision had a peculiar history compared
with the adoption of most changes in Connecticut's corporation
code. It was introduced late in the 1984 legislative session, passed
by both houses, and signed by the governor in approximately two
months. The irregularity is not the ease with which the legislation
was passed but the absence of process that marked its legislative
journey.
Connecticut requires all bills for consideration in a legislative
session to be introduced by a specified date. This requirement can
be circumvented by introducing the matter as an amendment to a
bill that was timely filed. Having missed or waited for the session's
deadline, the proponents of Connecticut's takeover statute had
their proposal attached as an amendment to a minor bill that con-
cerned the reservation of corporate names.3 9 That bill had been
38 United Technologies, 1983 Proxy Statement 14-19. United Technologies is headquar-
tered in Connecticut, but its statutory domicile is Delaware.
31 The use of the amendment procedure to avoid the filing deadline is not that uncom-
mon in Connecticut. At the Connecticut Lobbying Conference, which was held in Hartford
on October 8, 1985, legislators, staff personnel, and lobbyists recounted a number of in-
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sponsored by the Secretary of State's office and was supported by
the executive committee of the corporate law section of the state
bar association. The Secretary of State's office was not involved in
the drafting of the takeover provision and was not even aware of
the addition to its bill until after the amended bill was scheduled
for a vote on the senate floor. The bar committee was similarly not
apprised of the amendment until the eleventh hour.
A procedural advantage of the amendment process is that public
discussion of a bill may be bypassed. Connecticut mandates a pub-
lic hearing for all bills considered by the legislature, but there is no
requirement that an additional hearing be held on a bill that has
been substantively amended after its prescribed hearing.40 As a
consequence, no public hearings were held on the fair price statute.
After the joint judiciary committee's41 approval it went directly to
the floor of the senate for a vote.
3. The Role of the Bar
The third important player in the making of Connecticut's cor-
poration law, and the only organization that opposed the fair price
bill, was the executive committee of the corporate law section of
the state bar association. The executive committee consists of ap-
proximately forty-five members of the over six-hundred-member
corporate law section. The leading corporate lawyers in the state
serve on the committee. Its origin dates from the early 1960's,
when a special committee of the bar was established by legislative
act to revamp the stock corporation act. After its work was com-
pleted, the committee continued in an unofficial capacity to moni-
tor and update the corporation code.
Although attorneys for Aetna were members of the executive
stances where the amendment process was used to avoid the filing deadline.
40 The procedure's success depends upon the support of the majority party leaders.
Amendments can be challenged on the floor and struck from the agenda or subjected to a
hearing if they are not germane to the original bill. Party support for the amendment is
crucial because the speaker of the house or the president of the senate rules on germane-
ness. This is why Aetna and the CBIA contacted the majority party leaders to gain their
support to introduce the fair price provision. Given this institutional detail, the overwhelm-
ing vote for the statute was predictable: only a bill on which there is a powerful consensus
will survive the amendment process.
41 The judiciary committee has jurisdiction over corporation laws. All legislative commit-
tees in Connecticut are joint committees.
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committee, the committee was not informed of the proposed fair
price statute until the day it was favorably reported out of the
joint judiciary committee of the legislature. The bill was hastily
added to the agenda of the executive committee's monthly meet-
ing, which fortuitously was to be held two days later. At this meet-
ing, the Aetna attorney involved in drafting the provision ex-
plained the mechanics of the legislation that his firm was
promoting. After some discussion, the committee voted to oppose
the bill.42 A majority of the members disapproved of the substance
of the bill, but the bulk of the committee's opposition was proce-
dural. They had not been consulted, and they had not had suffi-
cient time to evaluate the merits of the proposal. In addition, a
majority of the committee members believed that a significant
change to the stock corporation act should not be adopted without
full public review. The source of the opposition to the takeover bill
was not ideological; attorneys who voted to oppose the statute have
divergent views, spanning the political spectrum from liberal to
conservative.
In an attempt to slow down what was presented to the executive
committee as a fait accompli, members contacted one of the legis-
lative leaders to voice the committee's opposition to the bill's expe-
dited progress. It is believed that the vote on the senate floor was
delayed for a few days as a result of this communication. At the
same time, an ad hoc committee of the executive committee met
with representatives of the CBIA to discuss the statute. But with
political support in place,43 Aetna and the CBIA had no intention
of acquiescing to delay the legislation by agreeing to a public hear-
4' The committee follows a majority voting rule in its decision to endorse or sponsor legis-
lation. This does not involve the bar association's taking a position-the association rarely
endorses legislation because of the unwieldy procedure requiring approval of the board of
governors and the entire membership. Rather, after clearance by the bar association's presi-
dent, the executive committee brings its suggestions to the legislature without the associa-
tion board's endorsement.
43 In fact, according to reports filed with the Connecticut State Ethics Commission for
1984, both Aetna and the CBIA took several legislators out to dine, for matters related to
lobbying, at the time the amendment was being introduced and reported out of the commit-
tee, on March 26 and 28. They also lobbied over meals in February and early March. Of
course, the lobbyists' disclosure statements of these events do not reveal the content of the
lobbying, and the timing may simply be coincidental. In addition, Aetna's chairman hosted
a buffet in May for the leading politicians in the state, an event that the company reported
as unrelated to lobbying activities. There was no such event in previous years, although,
again, the event may have had nothing to do with the enactment of the fair price provision.
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ing. The best that the executive committee could do was to extract
some minor drafting concessions, the most significant of which was
an exemption for companies not required to file reports pursuant
to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This
change limited the applicability of the fair price provision to public
corporations.
Ten days after the meeting between members of the executive
committee and attorneys for the CBIA and its members, the bill
passed the senate with only one negative vote.44 The bill was ap-
proved by the house on the consent calendar two weeks later.
Within one month, the governor signed it into law. The fair price
provision's legislative journey took slightly more than two months.
In keeping with the perceived urgency of the measure, the act's
effective date was the day of the signing, June 4, rather than the
usual October 1 date.
4. When Is a Takeover Statute Less Costly than a Charter
Amendment?
Even if the bar had succeeded in its effort to subject the fair
price provision to public scrutiny and debate, it is likely that the
statute would still have been enacted. The significant difference in
outcome, had the ordinary legislative process not been circum-
vented, most probably would have been a postponement in the
bill's effective date. For some reason, then, Aetna and the CBIA
must have believed that time was of the essence. In conversations
with corporate lawyers, several factors were suggested to me that
could have entered into Aetna's calculation to support legislation
rather than to engage in self-help by adopting a fair price charter
amendment. The simplest explanation, and the only one connected
to a concern over timing, is that because Aetna's annual sharehold-
ers' meeting had recently been held, Aetna's management would
have had either to call a special meeting, which would have been
expensive and likely to attract attention, or to wait an uncomforta-
bly long time-close to a year-until the next annual meeting in
order to place a fair price proposal in its charter. In this explana-
tion, a straightforward comparison of the cost of the alternative
"' When questioned about his vote, the senator could not recall why he opposed the bill.
He was not approached by the corporate law section's executive committee.
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procedures led Aetna to the legislature.
The difference in the timing of obtaining legislation compared to
waiting for the next annual meeting could have been crucial for
several reasons. For instance, Aetna may have felt the need to
hurry if it had been informed that there was unusual trading activ-
ity-perhaps the accumulation of a block-in its shares. This con-
cern, if present, would have been heightened by the fact that the
insurance industry, including Aetna, was performing poorly. In-
deed, Aetna was doing considerably worse than most insurance
firms, and several financial reports had published evaluations of
Aetna as a below-average investment choice.45 These negative rec-
ommendations may have made Aetna look like a takeover candi-
date. In fact, shortly after the statute was enacted, there was a
change in Aetna's top management, and the chairman resigned.
Given these circumstances, Aetna's counsel may have concluded
that the need for a statute was all the more pressing, because in
the wake of MITE and the invalidation of Connecticut's general
takeover law,46 the legality of Connecticut's insurance-company
takeover statute might be questioned next, leaving Aetna defense-
less: similar laws in other states had had a checkered constitutional
fate.47
Apart from timing, it is possible that a charter amendment
45 For instance, in March 1984, Value Line's analysis of Aetna reported: "We expect an-
other negative comparison for the March period. . . . We think Aetna will be lucky to re-
port 1984 earnings close to the depressed 1983 level. These shares are a subpar choice for
year-ahead relative market performance.... More attractive 3- to 5-year prospects can be
found elsewhere in the [insurance] group in our view." Value Line Investment Survey, Mar.
23, 1984, at 2067. As of March 1984, industry stock price performance was 5%, Aetna's
performance was -14%, and only three of the total 27 insurance industry group firms had
poorer stock performance than Aetna. Trendline's Current Market Perspectives (1984). In
addition, Trendline ranked Aetna in the bottom third decile of stocks for that period. Id.
For a discussion of Aetna's earnings, see Value Line Investment Survey, Dec. 23, 1983, at
2065, and Value Line Investment Survey, Mar. 23, 1984, at 2067. As early as December 1983,
Value Line suggested that despite Aetna's above-average dividend yield, investors could
"find higher total returns elsewhere in [the insurance] industry group." Value Line Invest-
ment Survey, Dec. 23, 1983, at 2065.
" Hi-Shear Indus. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,805
(D. Conn., Dec.* 16, 1980). The statute was then revised to conform to the Williams Act.
47 E.g., National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982) (Mis-
souri insurance-company takeover statute held unconstitutional). It is no coincidence that in
1985 Connecticut's insurance-company takeover statute was modified to conform its time
period requirements to those of the Williams Act. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-39b (West
Supp. 1986).
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would not have been approved by the Aetna shareholders, because
more than half of Aetna's shares were owned by institutions, which
often vote against shark repellent proposals.48 In such situations,
management will not want to risk rejection. The common wisdom
is that it is not the defeat at the ballot box itself that is deadly for
managers but the publicity surrounding the failure, for that can
signal to potential bidders that shareholder support for incumbent
management is weak. Moreover, even if the shareholders approve
the proposal, the public disclosure of a shark repellent agenda can
serve as a sign to raiders that management perceives the firm to be
a likely takeover target.49 In this explanation, Aetna favored a stat-
ute because it faced less uncertainty over the outcome of the legis-
lature's decision than of a decision by its own shareholders, and
because potential acquirers might not be able to identify that
Aetna was the concerned party behind the statute.
A final and less persuasive factor for desiring the statutory cloak
of anonymity is the embarrassment Aetna might have experienced,
as would many institutional investors, in having to take an incon-
sistent position. In its role as an investor, Aetna may have opposed
the adoption of shark repellent amendments by the managements
of the firms in which it had equity holdings. If this speculation is
correct, it would have been awkward for Aetna's management to
place such a provision in its own certificate of incorporation.
Some additional institutional detail might put events in better
perspective. Aetna has a history of concern over takeover regula-
tion. As early as 1969, Aetna's counsel testified in support of two
bills that would have codified takeover defenses.50 One bill, which
Aetna could have adopted as a charter provision, would have in-
creased the percentage of shareholders necessary to call a share-
48 When the statute was enacted, between 55% and 56% of Aetna's shares were held by
institutions. See Standard & Poor's New York Stock Exchange Stock Reports, Jan. 1984,
July 1984. Recent studies on the voting of institutional investors indicating when they op-
pose shark repellant charter amendments include E. Flax, Voting by Institutional Investors
on Corporate Governance Questions, 1985 Proxy Season (Investor Responsibility Research
Center 1985); Georgeson & Co., Institutional Voting on Fair-Pricing and Staggered Board
Amendments (1983). The voting behavior of institutions is discussed in Part III, infra.
4' Some managers may want to make their firm a less attractive target by adopting a fair
price provision to signal prospective acquirers that they will vigorously resist any unsolicited
bid.
50 Insurance Comm. Pub. Hearings, 1969 Conn. Gen. Assembly 14-15 (testimony of John
Graham, counsel for Aetna, on S.B. 930 and 931).
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holder meeting without board approval from ten to twenty-five
percent for insurance companies. The second bill required a holder
in street name of ten percent of an insurance company's stock to
reveal the identity of the beneficial owner to the company and the
state insurance commission. Neither bill was enacted. Instead, the
legislature passed a first generation-type takeover statute applica-
ble only to insurance companies, which Aetna also supported. In
short, the fair price provision was not the first instance in which
Aetna turned to the state legislature instead of its shareholders to
devise a mechanism for discouraging takeovers.
5. A Comparison with the Politics of Connecticut's Previous
Takeover Statutes
I am told that the legislative history of Connecticut's takeover
statutes is not in keeping with the way the corporation code is tra-
ditionally updated. Usually, the executive committee of the bar is
the pivotal sponsor of corporate law reform. There are good rea-
sons for this to be so. First, the committee has far greater expertise
in corporate law than any other group in the state. Its membership
includes the leading corporate law practitioners. Second, few Con-
necticut legislators are or have been corporate lawyers, and the leg-
islative committees in Connecticut have small staffs. This makes it
virtually impossible for significant revisions in the corporation
code to be generated independently by the judiciary committee.
However, the Aetna statute was not the first time that the exec-
utive committee was, to use one member's expression, "sandbag-
ged" by the CBIA. The executive committee was not consulted
concerning another recent change in the code that touched upon
takeovers. In 1982, at a special session of the legislature called for
emergency flood relief legislation, the corporation code was revised
to reduce the shareholder vote necessary for charter amendments
from two-thirds to a simple majority. The prime movers behind
the provision were the CBIA and a local firm, the Heublein Corpo-
ration.51 Heublein, even more so than Aetna, was pressed for time.
Heublein's stock was being accumulated by a hostile party, Gen-
eral Cinema Company. Heublein wanted to amend its charter to
51 Heublein and the CBIA were able to obtain the governor's support for consideration of
their bill in the special session. It was suggested to me that, similarly, the governor's office
supported the expeditious enactment of Aetna's proposal.
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increase its authorized shares in order to dilute General Cinema's
holdings. It would have been unable to do so under the two-thirds
voting requirement because of the typical number of shareholders
who return proxies at annual meetings-approximately seventy
percent 52 -and the expected no vote of General Cinema's shares.
There was a public hearing on the Heublein amendment during
the special session, but at that time the bar's executive committee
was in its periodic process of being reconstituted and the newly-
appointed chairman had yet to designate formally the committee
members. With one week to react and no members to organize, the
committee had little opportunity to have an impact on the course
of events. It was able to have the proposal revised to exclude non-
public corporations from the reduced voting requirement, a move
that protected the numerous shareholder agreements in small cor-
porations that relied on the two-thirds rule. The adoption of the
second generation takeover statute was essentially a replay of the
Heublein amendment's legislative history, in which the corporate
bar was limited to reacting and carving out exceptions to an impor-
tant bill. The major difference was that Aetna moved behind the
scenes, whereas Heublein publicly sought support for its bill to
stop a takeover that was in progress.
Astute observers of Connecticut politics emphasized two possible
explanations for the recent decline in influence of the executive
committee of the corporate bar. The first is a change in the politi-
cal environment: the creation of corporate political action commit-
tees (PACs) as a source of campaign financing may have increased
the influence of the CBIA and other business groups. I was told
that ten to fifteen years ago the Connecticut legislature was a quiet
and inefficient club that followed the bar's advice and was not es-
pecially partisan, but that it is now more subject to the influence
of interest groups, with the CBIA emerging as the important advo-
cate for business.
Although possible, I do not find this explanation of the increased
importance of PACs and partisanship in state politics particularly
convincing. To begin with, the takeover legislation had bipartisan
support. Moreover, the CBIA puts far greater resources into its
lobbying efforts, at a level relative to other lobbying grougs that
52 Judiciary Comm. Public Hearings, 1982 Conn. Gen. Assembly Spec. Sess., 12 (state-
ment of Stuart Watson, Chairman of the Board, Heublein Corporation).
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does not appear to have changed over time, than into its PAC. For
example, in the 1984 election, the CBIA's PAC spent a total of
$14,066, a sum substantially less than the legal limit, and Aetna's
PAC was not active.5 3 I cannot determine the relative importance
of these expenditures because there are as yet no figures available
on total PAC spending in Connecticut, but my impression is that
they are small.5 4 In addition, it is virtually impossible to attribute
a legislator's vote on a particular issue to the direct influence of a
specific campaign contribution. 55 Therefore, even if the CBIA
PAC's campaign contributions were substantial, it does not follow
that they would have had a discernible, let alone determinative,
effect on the voting for the takeover bill.
The second and more persuasive reason suggested to me for the
bar's peripheral role in recent legislation involves the subject mat-
ter of the bills. The legislature may be willing to go forward with-
out the bar committee's expertise in the takeover context because
of the keen interest of strong political forces and the absence of
any deep opposition to the regulation. Yet this explanation is not
entirely satisfactory either, because the initial effort at regulating
the takeover of general stock corporations in Connecticut had a
somewhat different history from the Aetna and Heublein amend-
ments. In 1975, the CBIA pushed for a first generation takeover
statute requiring preregistration and disclosure by bidders. At the
hearing on the bill, the executive committee indicated that it
would submit its own bill that would better conform to Connecti-
cut's code. As a result of the disagreement between the CBIA and
the executive committee, legislation was delayed until the follow-
ing session, when a compromise bill was adopted.56
This history suggests that, given a part-time legislature and lim-
ited staffing, whoever is more effective at educating the legislators
about their cause will prevail. 57 The CBIA, with its superior lobby-
" Aetna organized a PAC in 1984. It was inactive until 1985, when it contributed $2,000
to the Insurance Association of Connecticut's PAC.
" There are 36 state senators and 151 state representatives, and the PAC contribution
limits are $500 and $250, respectively, per candidate. The amount the CBIA PAC spent is
equivalent to making the maximum contribution to 25% of the total number of seats.
" See, e.g., Reuben, Tax and PACs: Drawing the Connection, 29 Tax Notes 1335 (1985).
" See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-456 to -469 (West 1981 & Supp. 1986); Banks Comm.,
Public Hearings, 1976 Conn. Gen. Assembly 136 (statement of Norman Parsells). It is be-
lieved that the statute was instigated by a local corporation that feared a hostile bid.
57 See W. Muir, Legislature (1982) (state legislature is a school in which the legislator is
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ing group and strong stake in takeover legislation, simply over-
whelmed the executive committee in the most recent rounds of
takeover legislation. To be sure, the strategy of surprise gave the
CBIA an edge. But in the takeover context, the CBIA's organiza-
tional advantage would be magnified because some of the bar com-
mittee's members would, undoubtedly, be reluctant to take a firm
public position in order to avoid possible conflict with the wishes
of clients.
6. The Absence of Coalition Politics
Although the takeover legislation was unopposed in the state
legislature, there is no evidence to support a coalition explanation.
No nonbusiness group showed any interest in, let alone endorsed,
the bill. In particular, organized labor took no position. As a labor
representative and lobbyist described its strategy, Connecticut or-
ganized labor does not take a position on takeovers in the abstract
because it is more important to lobby on issues of greater immedi-
ate concern to employees."8
In addition to interviewing individuals involved in the statute's
enactment, I surveyed all registered lobbyists to see if I had
missed, or the parties had forgotten, any source of political sup-
port. The questionnaire responses confirmed that the fair price
statute was of no interest to anyone beyond Aetna, the CBIA, and
the corporate bar.8 The absence of notice and publicity concerning
educated by lobbyists and other informed individuals).
1s For instance, labor did actively lobby in the previous legislative session, 1983, for a
plant-closing law, which was defeated. See Labor Scorns CBIA Plant Closing Code, Conn.
Bus. J., Jan. 17-23, 1984, at 1, 11. The CBIA vigorously opposed the bill and devised as a
compromise a voluntary code of conduct for workplace reduction for its members. Id. To the
extent that plant closings sometimes follow hostile takeovers because changes in control can
result in "lean and mean" management, labor's support for that bill might be vaguely asso-
ciated with a coalition explanation of takeover regulation. But even then there was no coali-
tion: business associations uniformly opposed the plant closing bill, most certainly contrib-
uting to its defeat.
89 Of 661 questionnaires, 229 responded that they took no position on the statute. These
numbers are not adjusted for multiple lobbyists and for 16 questionnaires that were re-
turned as undeliverable. In addition to the CBIA, two respondents-a major corporation
and a business association-stated that they took a position in favor of the legislation.
These three organizations accounted for seven questionnaires because of multiple lobbyists.
Aetna's lobbyists (two questionnaires) informed me that it is their policy not to participate
in surveys. I have no reason to believe that the positions or activities of nonrespondents
other than Aetna are distributed differently from those of the respondents.
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the bill surely contributed to a lack of interest in or knowledge of
the legislation by lobbyists, but there are other plausible reasons
why nonbusiness interest groups would not take a position in favor
of the bill. In particular, many Connecticut lobbyists and legisla-
tors believe that organizations should not take positions on issues
that are not directly linked to their primary cause, because lobby-
ing for a bill that does not directly concern a client may adversely
affect subsequent lobbying for the client's bills should legislators
draw negative associations between the two unrelated lobbying ef-
forts.6 0 Although broad-based coalitions are effective on occasion,
most lobbyists are hesitant to advocate their use.
A related and equally important reason for the lack of interest in
the fair price statute by other lobbying groups is that successful
lobbying takes time and money. Lobbyists emphasized that even
the CBIA, with its substantial budget, directs its attention to no
more than two or three major pieces of legislation in a session. The
need to prioritize in order to be effective further indicates the im-
portance Aetna attached to the passage of the fair price statute
and Aetna's influence within the CBIA.
While there is no evidence of a coalition explanation for Con-
necticut's second generation takeover statute, legislators who sup-
ported the bill may have thought that it would benefit unions or
community groups, even though these organizations neither ac-
tively lobbied for the bill nor perceived it to be necessarily in their
interest. Yet that rhetoric was absent from the abbreviated discus-
sion of the bill.," Such a motive is at best implicit.
A superior explanation of the adoption of Connecticut's fair
price provision starts from the thesis that lawmakers react to de-
mands to solve immediate, concrete problems. This is an emenda-
tion of the view that organizations are managed by "putting out
fires." The explanation makes particularly good sense as a behav-
ioral theory in the state legislature setting, where there are sub-
1o Statements made at Connecticut Lobbying Conference, supra note 39.
61 When the merits of the first takeover statute and the Heublein amendment were dis-
cussed, some legislators implied that they supported the bills because limiting takeovers
would bolster the local economy by maintaining employment levels. See 1982 Conn. Gen.
Assembly, House Proceedings, Spec. Sess. 40-42 (remarks of Rep. Barnes.on the Heublein
amendment); 1976 Conn. Gen. Assembly, Senate Proceedings 1518 (remarks of Sen. Dinielli
on the first generation takeover statute).
62 See R. Cyert & J. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 99-100, 118-20 (1963).
1987]
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stantial transaction costs to planning because the membership
turns over periodically, staffs are small, and the work is often per-
formed part-time. More important, if, as political scientists main-
tain, voters cast their ballots retrospectively,3 the incentives for
legislators to respond to immediate problems are great. In this in-
stance, Connecticut legislators were presented with an immediate
constituent demand, and there was no opposition except from the
executive committee of the bar. Even then, the committee's oppo-
sition was not publicized. Any possible political damage from en-
dorsing the bill was negligible, and politically there was something
to be gained. Moreover, the business community was united in
support of a specific law, and as a consequence, a complex solution
did not have to be negotiated among numerous parties.
7. How Representative Is Connecticut's Experience?
Although I did not conduct interviews in states other than Con-
necticut and documentation is sparse, my impression is that the
experience of other states is similar to Connecticut's. Local corpo-
rations, their lobbying organizations, and state bar groups64 were
63 See M. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981).
" There is variation among the states in the degree of involvement of state bar commit-
tees in second generation takeover legislation. In a number of states, in contrast to Connect-
icut, the corporate bar appears to have been active in initiating a bill. For instance, the
Maryland legislation was drafted and revised by the state bar association. Virginia recently
updated its entire corporation code, in an official revision process undertaken by the corpo-
rate bar, and a fair price provision was included in the final product. In addition, the corpo-
rate law section of the state bar association in Washington was responsible for drafting cor-
poration code revisions that included a fair price provision. It is possible that the bar
associations in those states have better relations with local legislators than the Connecticut
bar, but it is also possible that in those states the source of the proposal was a drafting
committee member's client. I was told that the Washington fair price provision, which sailed
through the state bar association and the legislature, was the bar committee's response to a
local corporation's desire for a statute modeled after Pennsylvania's redemption rights
provision.
An additional explanation of the differences in behavior of corporate bar committees
might be that recruitment for committee membership varies across the states. In Connecti-
cut, where efforts are made at having the executive committee represent different segments
of the corporate bar, the disagreement among the members over the fair price statute may
have been colored, as would be expected, by clients' interests. For example, the members
who were outside counsel to Aetna and the CBIA supported the bill and did not want the
committee to interfere with the legislation's passage, while some members who opposed the
law had, as clients, small corporations whose shareholder arrangements could be jeopardized
by the provision. It would therefore be important to determine how representative of the
corporate bar the members of the committees are in these other states before drawing
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  136 1987
Takeover Statutes
most active in the passage of the bills. More important, the con-
cern of a local firm that it might be acquired was quite often the
impetus for the legislation. For instance, in the floor debate on the
Maine legislation, one representative referred to the "corporation
that was the instigator of (the) bill."65 In Pennsylvania, the statute
was drafted and promoted by the state chamber of commerce at
the suggestion of its members and, in particular, of a local corpora-
tion that was trying to prevent a shift in control.66 In addition, the
Illinois statute was apparently promoted by "one prominent Illi-
nois corporation. 67 A sharper example is emergency legislation
that extended Missouri's control share acquisition statute to for-
eign common carriers that have benefitted from physical facilities
financed by Missouri subdivisions and that have over 7,500 em-
ployees in Missouri. At the time, Trans World Airlines, the only
corporation known to meet the statutory requirements, was fend-
ing off a takeover by Carl Icahn.6e
Although the information I have is incomplete, the source of po-
litical support for a second generation takeover statute appears to
differ somewhat according to the type of provision adopted. In
three states, labor endorsed the legislation, and in two of these in-
stances the states were considering control share acquisition provi-
sions rather than fair price or redemption rights statutes.6 9 In Mis-
conclusions.
'5 Maine Legislative Record-House, June 3, 1985, at 918 (remarks of Rep. Stevens).
69 Pennsylvania Senate is Seen Near Vote on Bill that May Deter Dissident Investors,
Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1983, at 12, col. 1. This is undoubtedly the reason for the particular form
of the Pennsylvania statute: A nonmanagement shareholder was trying to increase its 23.7%
holdings, and a fair price provision would not have aided the corporation as well as the
redemption rights provision did.
'7 McKenna & Bitner, The "Fair Price" Amendment in the Illinois Business Corporation
Act, 67 Chicago Bar Rec. 64, 74 n.59 (1986).
68 See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.575(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Trans World Airline's respite
was short-lived; the amendment was held unconstitutional. See Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp.'
1400, 1414-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The technique, however, appears to be common. Kentucky
also passed, virtually overnight, a takeover statute to help a local corporation, the Ashland
Oil Company, fight a hostile bid. State Helps Ashland Fight Belzberg Bid, The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Apr. 1, 1986, at B3, col 3.
" The third state was New York, which adopted a fair price provision that had labor's
support after the governor had vetoed a fair price and control share acquisition statute. See
Sussman & Sussman, Anti-Takeover Law Set for Litigation, Legal Times of New York, Jan.
20, 1986, at Al, A24-25. The vetoed bill was drafted by the Business Council of New York
State, an association of small and large businesses, and reports of the lobbying efforts lead-
ing to the governor's veto do not refer to labor's involvement. See Cuomo Vetoes Takeover
19871
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souri, at committee hearings at which no opposition was present,
groups identified as testifying in support included two local corpo-
rations, a business association, the state chamber of commerce, and
the state labor council.70 In Ohio, newspaper accounts indicate that
the law was supported by the state bar and labor, though it is un-
clear how active labor was in the initiation, drafting, or lobbying
efforts.7 1
It is interesting to note that the control share acquisition statute
is more intrusive in the takeover process than a fair price provision
because it directly delays an offer. It also provides less leeway for
managers to negotiate a deal because board approval does not
eliminate the need for a shareholder vote. One possibility is that
when labor's support is involved the goal is to discourage bids
more decisively by providing more extensive regulation and less
managerial discretion to accept an offer. But this is speculation.
The information is so sketchy that I would not make much of the
distinction.
8. Why Is There Such Overwhelming Support for Takeover
Statutes?
Despite the minor differences in the lobbying process across
states, there is remarkable uniformity in the reaction of state legis-
latures: the second generation takeover statutes are approved by
wide margins, if not by unanimous vote, with virtually no publicity
or controversy surrounding their introduction and passage. 2 There
Curb Bill, New York Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at D1, D2, col. 4.
70 Missouri Legislative History 377 (produced for third reading of bill) (copy on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
71 See Congress, Ohio Enter Takeover Wars, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), July 31, 1983, at
1E, col. 2.
71 Of the 14 states with second generation statutes at the time I began this study, the
legislative history of Maryland's statute is the only anomaly to the pattern of little or no
publicity or controversy concerning the regulation. After the bill passed the Maryland legis-
lature by overwhelming margins and without controversy and the bill reached the governor's
desk, several major corporations lobbied against it because, as drafted, it would have dis-
rupted the orderly conduct of their affairs. For example, it would have required a
supermajority shareholder vote for the routine sale of jeeps between the Maryland corpora-
tion American Motors and its French parent Renault. Maryland Bill on Takeovers Spurs a
Fight, Wall St. J., May 26, 1983, at 33, col. 2; Maryland Assembly Panels Pass Corporate
Takeover Bill, Washington Post, June 15, 1983, at C4, col. 3. The governor thereupon vetoed
the bill and called a special legislative session to revise the statute and remedy the problem
by exempting from the statute's reach the corporations that had objected-mutual funds
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is a standard explanation for legislation that generates no signifi-
cant opposition. Namely, if the benefits of a bill are directed to a
specific group and the costs are diffuse, it is likely to be enacted:
The benefitted group will lobby intensively for its passage, and no
organized opposition will emerge because no one group is particu-
larly burdened by the law.73 This explanation is often attached to a
logrolling story that is referred to as "pork barrel" politics. In the
logrolling explanation, laws are packaged-a notable example is a
"rivers and harbors" bill-so that each of the many groups repre-
sented in a legislature obtains its desired benefit and the cost of
the projects is spread among the entire citizenry.
Takeover laws, however, do not fall neatly within a logrolling ex-
planation. The bills are typically introduced and approved as dis-
crete pieces of legislation. Moreover, there are some identifiable
potential losers from this type of legislation: bidding firms and the
financial intermediaries who facilitate takeovers.7 4 But this very
fact points out a related explanation of the legislators' unanimity
and firms with 10% shareholders. But even this story confirms the basic pattern in the
other states: There was no opposition to the statute's goal of regulating takeovers, and non-
business interests were not active in the legislative process.
The experience in New York, when it failed to enact a second generation statute, was
similar to that of Maryland. There was little publicity and no opposition in the legislature.
But when the legislature passed the bill, a major New York corporation, CBS, was fending
off a takeover attempt by Ted Turner in a highly publicized defense, and the bill came to be
perceived as an effort by CBS to thwart Turner's bid. Both sides, including Turner's New
York investment banker, vigorously lobbied the governor, and he vetoed the bill, question-
ing its constitutionality and indicating that he would work to draft an alternative bill for
introduction in the following session. Gov. Cuomo Vetoes Anti-Takeover Bill for New York
State, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1985, at 13, col. 4; Major Brokerages Mount Catch-up Bid to Kill
Anti-Takeover Bill in New York, Wall St. J., July 1, 1985, at 4, col. 2; New York May Pass
Anti-Takeover Bill That Could Help CBS Fight Turner Bid, Wall St. J., June 27, 1985, at
39, col. 2. He in fact did so. Cuomo Bill Offered on Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at
D1, col. 3. In the absence of an ongoing bid, the legislation quite likely would have gone
unnoticed and unopposed, as in other states.
Although the presence of investment bankers in New York might make a difference in its
politics, New York enacted a second generation statute as this article was written. This
statute was also enacted while a hostile bid was in progress, but the New York firm was not
covered by the legislation because it was headquartered in Connecticut. There is an impor-
tant distinguishing feature of the second bill that some believe created a less vociferous
opposition. The revised bill was sponsored by the governor. This apparently changed the
cost-benefit analysis of opponents of the legislation-the bill was not deemed important
enough to incur the wrath of the governor.
73 See J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); M. Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action 125-31 (1970).
74 Whether target shareholders are losers is analyzed in Part III, infra.
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that emphasizes a disadvantage of a federal system-the benefits
and burdens of a law may not be contained within the legislating
jurisdiction. When this occurs, interjurisdictional subsidization and
exploitation can result, as citizens of the legislating state may ben-
efit from the law while citizens of another state bear the costs. 75 If
acquisition-oriented firms and financial intermediaries do not re-
side in all states, then takeover legislation could be an excellent
example of such an externality-imposing statute, for non-residents,
who cannot meaningfully interpose their views in the legislative
process, bear the costs. 76
There is some support for an externality explanation of state
takeover legislation. First, the domicile choice of acquiring firms is
not random. The largest manufacturing firms incorporated in Del-
aware have engaged in a greater number of acquisitions averaged
over their lifetimes than their counterparts in other states, and, of
firms changing their state of incorporation in order to facilitate a
mergers and acquisition program, more relocate in Delaware than
in any other state.77 Thus, it is quite plausible to assume that ac-
quiring firms are disproportionately domiciled in one state, Dela-
ware, and are less likely to be located in other states.
Second, takeover statutes are generally thought to raise the cost
of acquisitions. Although one might expect that some of the in-
crease in bid cost might be passed on to the target company share-
holders, the empirical research on acquisitions implies that acquir-
ing firms bear all the cost.78 In short, the cost that the legislation
" A parallel characteristic of lobbying at the national level supporting this explanation is
that congressmen are more responsive to interest groups that are constituency-based than to
Washington-based lobbyists. See M. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political
Markets 49-50 (1981) (citing J. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions 145-46 (1973)).
" Ralph Winter distinguished first generation takeover statutes from other corporate
laws with a somewhat different externality argument, that by applying to more than domes-
tic corporations, the statutes had an extraterritorial effect and restrained competition, see
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal
Stud. 251, 268, 287-89 (1977), but second generation statutes do not have such broad juris-
dictional bases.
7 Romano, supra note 6, at 255-56, 263. Of course, nearly all Delaware firms are not
headquartered in Delaware, and each firm presumably has more influence in the other juris-
diction. But the sheer numbers of firms incorporated in Delaware and the profitability of its
charter business make that state highly responsive to firms' desires, despite the lack of
physical presence. See id. at 240-42.
78 The enactment of the Williams Act raised takeover premiums, Jarrell & Bradley, The
Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. Law & Econ.
140 [Vol. 73:111
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may impose would typically be borne by out-of-state acquiring
firms. In this regard, it is not a coincidence that Delaware, while a
consistent leader in corporate law innovation, was slow to adopt a
first generation takeover statute 7  and has not yet adopted a sec-
ond generation one. Its legislature is more attuned to a wider mix
of corporate interests, including those of acquiring firms, because
it has more acquirers within its jurisdiction. In addition, the Dela-
ware legislature acts only upon a proposal's endorsement by the
state bar association, whose members represent those diverse inter-
ests.80 There are also more potential targets in Delaware, which
would make the return to acquiring firms and intermediaries from
lobbying against takeover legislation higher in Delaware than in
any other state. While these potential target firms might desire
statutory protection, the presence of acquirers may produce a dif-
ferent equilibrium in Delaware, in which firms rely primarily on
self-help.
More important, because hundreds of large corporations are
domiciled, though not headquartered, in Delaware, no one firm has
the substantial political influence that Aetna, for instance, has in
Connecticut. Research on the incorporation decisions of the largest
manufacturing firms dovetails with the findings concerning Con-
necticut's takeover statute. Many large corporations that had not
migrated to Delaware believed that moving might adversely affect
a highly prized intangible asset, the investments they had made in
cultivating local political ties.8 The experience in Connecticut sug-
gests that one of the returns on such an investment is the ability to
obtain, without much effort, a modern-day version of a special
charter, a bill primarily designed to benefit one firm.
371, 373, 387-403 (1980), and, on average, acquiring firms do not experience abnormal re-
turns, while target firms do, Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 22 (1983).
79 Delaware enacted a first generation takeover statute in 1975. This was seven years after
such a statute had been initially fashioned by Virginia. Six states had already enacted a
takeover statute, and four other states also passed such a law in 1975, whereas Delaware was
either the first or second state to adopt other important corporate law innovations. See
Romano, supra note 6, at 233-34, 240, 246. In addition, the Delaware statute was less hostile
to bidders than those of other states: it had no hearing requirement, and firms could opt out
of its coverage.
10 See comments of Judge Andrew Moore in Symposium on the Forces Shaping Corporate
Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987).
SI Romano, supra note 6, at 278.
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C. Predicting the Adoption of a Second Generation Takeover
Statute
An additional avenue of investigating the adequacy of a coalition
explanation, given its inconsistency with the evidence from Con-
necticut, is to examine which story explains better the pattern of
adoption across the states. I did this through a series of regression
equations, choosing as explanatory variables factors that capture
the gist of the coalition explanation and the putting-out-fires ex-
planation represented by the political experience in Connecticut. A
further advantage of this approach is that by increasing the num-
ber of observations, the sampling error that can occur from relying
primarily on a case study is reduced.
The coalition explanation implies that a state is more likely to
enact takeover statutes (1) the more influence organized non-busi-
ness interest groups have in state politics, because their prefer-
ences will tend to be reflected in legislation; and (2) the less eco-
nomically-prosperous the state, because a change in control of even
one firm would be important to the local populace. The putting-
out-fires explanation suggests that (1) the larger the number of do-
mestic firms engaging in hostile takeovers, the less likely the pas-
sage of a takeover law, because then the business community's in-
terests will not be unified over a statute; (2) the absence of
legislative staff and the part-time status of state legislators should
affect the legislative output, because without independent staff ad-
vice, legislators must rely on lobbyists for evaluation of technical
legislation such as a takeover statute and will be less likely to op-
pose the proposal in the face of strong demand; and (3) a state's
economic prosperity is relevant here as well as for the coalition ex-
planation, because to the extent that firms doing poorly tend to be
acquisition targets, it is more probable that in economically de-
pressed states a major firm will sponsor a takeover statute.
Several equations were estimated, using logit and probit models
in which the dependent variable was the state's binary choice of
whether or not to adopt a second generation takeover statute, and
ordinary least squares models in which the dependent variable was
the state's rank in order of adopting a second generation statute.
The predictor variables were chosen from the variables in the fol-
lowing clusters that roughly measure the effects discussed above:
(1) variables testing the coalition explanation-the percent of non-
agricultural employees who were union members in 1980, and a
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dummy variable for the strength of pressure groups in the state's
political process; 82 (2) variables indicating relative economic pros-
perity-the percent change in individuals employed in manufac-
turing from 1980 to 1982, the percent change in per capita income
from 1977 to 1982, per capita income as a percentage of the na-
tional average in 1982, and the average rate of unemployment; (3)
variables in keeping with the putting-out-fires explanation-the
number of domestic NYSE corporations that have engaged in a
hostile bid83 and dummy variables for full- or part-time legisla-
tures and for whether individual legislators are provided with their
own staff."'
Because the results did not differ with regression technique, I
will discuss only those of the least squares regressions. I estimated
a variety of models, using the selection method that maximizes the
sample R2 and comparing the results with Mallow's Cp criterion
for model selection.85 The more complex models did not do signifi-
cantly better, and in fact did worse, than simpler models; models
" This index was created by a political scientist who divided the states into those where
pressure groups are strong (22 states), moderately strong (18 states), and weak (10 states).
S. Morehouse, State Politics, Parties and Policy 108-12 (1981).
3 The number of hostile bidders was generated from a database graciously provided to
me by John Pound and the staff of the Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC. In addi-
tion to using as a regressor the absolute number of domestic NYSE hostile bidders, I also
used the percentage of hostile bidders of successful acquirers in the state and of total firms
in the state, on the ground that it is relative presence, and not absolute numbers, that mat-
ters in influencing the legislature. I also included as a variable the number of domestic
NYSE corporations, the direction of which is in theory indeterminate: Although the smaller
the number of corporations, the more influence any one firm may have on state politics, the
larger the number of firms, the more likely one will be a target desirous of protective legisla-
tion. I used a log transformation of this variable on the theory that a change from one to
two firms would be more significant than a change from 100 to 101 firms. This transforma-
tion also mitigates the effect of the observation for Delaware. But I should note that
whether I used the log or the raw numbers, in virtually all of the models estimated, the
influence of the residual for the Delaware observation was not significant under Cook's D
measure of influence. See Cook, Influential Observations in Linear Regression, 74 J. Am.
Stat. Ass'n 169 (1979).
" I also included as a variable the size of the state legislature. This is a factor that can
affect the success of special bills, although the direction of the effect is in theory indetermi-
nate: In a larger legislature it is cheaper for a lobbyist to "purchase" influence from a legis-
lator-the legislator has less monopoly power because he has more competition from other
lawmakers-but each legislator's vote is, correspondingly, less influential on the outcome.
See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation and the Economy: An Inquiry into
the Interest-Group Theory of Government 29-45 (1981).
,1 See G. Judge, W. Griffiths, R. Hill & T. Lee, The Theory and Practice of Econometrics
862-64 (2d ed. 1985).
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containing only five or six variables have most of the explanatory
power for the variability in statute adoption as that of the full
model. Table one reports the results of three simple models and a
full model.86
Table one. Regression models for the adoption of a second generation statute.
(a) Full Model:
Rank = 42.53 - .50 Union - 6.51 Ln(NYSE) + 10.37 %HostileAcqrs
(.80) (-1.31) (-1.95) (2.10)*
+ 6.50 FulltLeg - .06 Legsize - 5.36 PrfStaff + 6.62 StrongGrp
(.91) (-2.03)* (-1.02) (1.22)
+ .67 ModGrp + 7.46 %ChngeMfg - 1.18 AvUnempl + .06 Income (%natav)
(.14) (.15) (-.85) (.32)
F = 2.59* R2 = .4282
(b) Simple Models:
1. Rank = 48.64 - .72 Union - 13.44 Ln (NYSE) + .78 Hostile
(8.62)* (-2.88)* (-4.26)* (2.97)*
+ 10.11 %HostileAcqrs + 6.16 FulltLeg
(2.33)* (1.21)
F = 6.65* R2 = .4306
2. Rank = 34.07 - .75 Union - 13.9 Ln(NYSE) + 4.08 FulltLeg
(2.92)* (-3.04)* (-4.43)* (.78)
+ .17 Inc(%natav) + .76 Hostile + 9.21 %Hostile
(1.42) (2.94)* (2.13)*
F = 6.01* R2 = .4561
3. Rank = 35.25 - .66 Union - 7.75 Ln(NYSE) - .05 LegSize(2.80)* (-2.91)* (-2.73)* (-1.89)
+ .16 Inc(%natav) + 8.99 %Hostile + 3.21 StrongGrp
(1.34) (1.98) (.93)
F = 4.89* R2 = .4054
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
* = significant at 5% level.
The regression results offer some support for both explanations
of takeover statute adoption. The overall equations were signifi-
cant and explained approximately forty percent of the variation in
8* I further chose among the simpler models to report in table one by whether they in-
cluded variables related to each of the explanations of takeover statute adoption and
whether collinearity could be detected by the variance decomposition proportions method.
See id. at 902-04.
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rank. There is a significant negative relation between enacting a
second generation takeover statute and the presence of domesti-
cally incorporated hostile bidders.87 There is also a significant posi-
tive relation between enacting a statute and having higher union
membership and more NYSE firms. In addition, although not sta-
tistically significant, the signs of the economic and legislative vari-
ables are largely as predicted-economic prosperity and having a
full-time legislature are associated with not having adopted take-
over legislation."' Hence, the statistical analyses do not allow us to
select with confidence one explanation over the other. However, I
prefer the putting-out-fires explanation because, unlike the coali-
tion explanation, it is supported by the regressions, the Connecti-
cut experience, and available data on the enactment of statutes in
other states.
III. THE RATIONALITY OF INVESTOR SUPPORT OF FAIR PRICE
PROVISIONS
To the extent that the putting-out-fires explanation fits the to-
tality of the evidence better than the coalition explanation, the in-
centive effects of the different statutes on shareholders must be
examined carefully to determine if the managers promoting the
laws are acting in their shareholders' interest. To do so, I first ex-
amine the related issue of firms' voluntary actions by analyzing
shareholder tender decisions in the context of the different shark
repellent rules the statutes codify and identifying when they may
benefit some shareholders. Such an explanation should shed light
on what gains, if any, can be expected when these provisions are
included in corporation codes, and on whether one should antici-
pate that firms that promote a statute will have anything in com-
37 To interpret the results, it is necessary to note that higher ranks indicate the absence
of a statute, and hence, a positive coefficient means the variable is related to not having
enacted a takeover law.
" The sign of the professional staff dummy variable changed from positive in regressions
with fewer variables and with the absolute number of hostile bidders as a regressor to nega-
tive in more complex models or in models without that variable. In addition, the coefficient
of the legislative size variable was negative, and significant in some of the regressions as
indicated in table one. I have only an ex post explanation: Because second generation take-
over statutes are not controversial, the key for a proponent may be to find a legislator will-
ing to introduce the bill, and in a larger-sized legislature it will be cheaper to obtain a
sponsor.
1987]
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mon with the firms that adopt similar charter amendments.
Many commentators maintain that a rational shareholder should
not vote for shark repellent charter provisions of the sort that the
second generation takeover statutes codify. They contend that ra-
tional shareholders vote for antitakeover amendments, although
the amendments are not in their interest, out of ignorance, because
it is too time-consuming for most shareholders to become informed
about the disadvantages of the proposals.8 9 My starting point is
different. Given both the extensive commentary on shark repellent
amendments in the press and in legal journals, and the SEC's man-
dated disclosure in proxy statements of the potential harm to
89 See, e.g., Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limita-
tions on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775, 824-25 (1982). Gilson further maintains
that informed investors such as institutions, although they uniformly vote against such pro-
posals, find little gain in vigorous opposition that would aid in informing other shareholders,
because shark repellents are largely ineffective at preventing takeovers. Id. at 825-27. This is
an odd explanation. If shark repellent amendments are as ineffective as Gilson argues, it is
difficult to understand why managers desire them or why, to use the Connecticut example,
Aetna sought legislation. Furthermore, the voting pattern of sophisticated institutional in-
vestors is more complex than Gilson maintains. Institutional voting on shark repellent
amendments tends to vary with the size of holdings: Institutions with small blocks vote for,
and institutions with large blocks vote against, fair price and other standard shark repellent
provisions. Georgeson & Co., supra note 48. In addition, institutions are more willing to
support fair price provisions than supermajority requirements. Flax, supra note 48. This
voting pattern is in keeping with the findings of SEC, Shark Repellent Amendment Study,
supra note 26, at 5, that supermajority provisions have a statistically significant negative
effect on share prices while fair price provisions do not.
Gilson also speculates that shareholders who support the amendments may actually be
informed about the negative effects on takeovers and vote for the provisions because of the
income they derive from other dealings with the firm that might be disrupted after a change
in control. Gilson, supra, at 823-24. He provides the following fanciful example of when this
could occur: a shareholder who operates a tavern across the street from a plant of a target
fears that the bidder will close the plant, which will reduce the value of the tavern business.
Id. However, there is no evidence that shareholders who vote for these amendments are
wearing different hats. For instance, there is no data of which I am aware that indicate that
the wealth of the shareholders favoring shark repellent amendments depends on relation-
ships with the firm other than their equity investment. Further, as a theoretical matter, the
assertion makes little sense. The teaching of modern portfolio theory on the benefits of
diversification suggests that an individual would seek to own shares in unrelated companies.
One might argue, drawing on option pricing theory, that the tavern owner could buy shares
in the target to create a hedge, on the assumption that the target will close the plant when
that maximizes profits and therefore when tavern income goes down, share income goes up.
But this reasoning would not suggest that the tavern owner vote for a fair price provision, as
Gilson's thesis implies. Finally, and more important, Gilson does not detail the basis-the
market failure-for assuming that the plant and tavern will not be able to maximize joint
profits when it comes to the decision on closing the plant.
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shareholders of the provisions, it is difficult to imagine that inves-
tors have no information about the possible negative effects of
such amendments.90 Additional anecdotal evidence of the ability of
shareholders to vote on charter amendments in an informed fash-
ion can be gleaned from the pattern of adoption of other defensive
tactics. Poison pills, which are thought to be the most effective
mechanism for defeating hostile bids,"' do not require a share-
holder vote for their enactment. Managers consistently do not put
poison pill plans up for shareholder approval, even though ob-
taining shareholder ratification could insulate managers from liti-
gation. Other Draconian tactics, such as restructuring the firm's
real and financial assets, similarly are not put to a shareholder
vote. Both of these defensive strategies have been found to have
statistically significant negative effects on shareholder wealth.92
The most plausible explanation of management's behavior is that
it believes that shareholders would reject a poison pill or restruc-
turing proposal and includes on the proxy agenda only tactics, like
fair price provisions, that it knows a majority of shareholders will
find acceptable.93 My inclination is, therefore, to reject market fail-
ure explanations and to approach the issue from the opposite di-
90 The effect of these amendments on shareholder wealth-or analogously, investors' per-
ceptions of the effect of these amendments on future cash flows-is ambiguous. The find-
ings of studies of the impact of the adoption of shark repellent amendments on share prices
are inconclusive, reporting both negative and positive directional effects that typically have
no statistical significance. See DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and
Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 329, 349-55 (1983) (negative direction but not statisti-
cally significant); Linn & McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Antitake-
over Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 361, 378-94 (1983) (positive
direction but in most cases not statistically significant); SEC, Shark Repellent Amendment
Study, supra note 26, at 43-44 (fair price amendments have no statistically significant effect;
other shark repellent amendments have statistically significant negative effect).
91 See Gilson, supra note 89, at 792-804; Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, The
Economics of Poison Pills (Mar. 5, 1986) [hereinafter SEC, Poison Pills Study].
92 See L. Dann & H. DeAngelo, Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate Control: A
Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure, Managerial Economics
Research Center, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester, Working Paper
No. 86-11, at 22-24 (1986); SEC, Poison Pills Study, supra note 91. Dann and DeAngelo's
study examines only four types of restructuring-acquisitions, divestitures, stock issuances,
and repurchases-undertaken by firms publicly opposing a takeover attempt.
13 Proxy solicitation firms typically advise managers on whether their corporation's share-
holders will support a proposed shark repellent amendment before management decides to
go forward with one. These solicitation firms maintain historical records of the voting pat-
terns of institutional investors on shark repellent provisions and will predict whether an
amendment will pass as well as aid in lobbying investors for their support.
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rection by exploring under what circumstances shareholders who
are fully informed about takeover rules would still favor shark re-
pellent provisions.
A. A Decision-Tree Analysis of the Decision to Tender
The incentive effects of shark repellent provisions on sharehold-
ers' decisions concerning takeover bids can be evaluated more eas-
ily by use of decision trees. The diagrams in figures 1-8 portray the
decision problem for shareholders of firms that vary according to
whether they are subject to a fair price, plain supermajority, re-
demption rights, or control share acquisition provision. By conven-
tion, squares in a diagram represent decisions and circles indicate
uncertain events (events whose outcomes are governed by chance).
The following definitions are used in the diagrams:
X, = price per share of first-tier tender offer
X, = price per share in second-tier merger
M, = market price per share after a successful bid
M, = market price per share if the bid fails and there is
no subsequent bid
X3 = price offered by a competing bidder if the bid fails
p = the probability the tender offer succeeds
a = (1-p)/3 = the probability that the tender offer
fails and there is no second bid9
a = 2(1-p)/3 = the probability that the tender offer
fails and there is a second bid
q = the probability the merger is approved when there
is a fair price provision
r = the probability that the merger is rejected when
there is a fair price provision and the bidder takes
no further action
s = the probability that the merger is rejected when
there is a fair price provision and the bidder pays
the required price, Xi, to complete the transaction
h = the probability an appraisal court will value a dis-
senter's shares at M.
Approximately two-thirds of firms that reject takeover bids are subsequently acquired
in another bid within five years of the defeated offer, and one-third experience no other bid.
Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Syn-
ergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183, 188 (1983).
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(1-h) = the probability an appraisal court will value a dis-
senter's shares at X1
n = of the amount by which the probability of the
merger's rejection is increased when a shareholder
votes no to the merger and the vote matters, the
proportion that goes to increasing r.
Assumptions derived from empirical research on acquisitions
concerning the magnitude of the relative values of the payoffs will
be introduced to work through the decision trees. The general
structure of the payoffs is:
(0-a) M2 < X2 < X,
(0-b) M1 < Xi < X.
The first relation indicates the typical structure of a two-step ac-
quisition: the bidder pays a premium to proceed with the merger
at the second step (M. < X2), but the price paid in the second
step is less than the price paid in the first step (Xz < X1). I ig-
nore the case of an acquisition in which X. = X1, because a fair
price or redemption rights rule is superfluous in that situation.
The second relation depicts what happens to the stock price of tar-
get firms that reject a takeover bid. When a bid fails, the market
price is higher than the bid price, reflecting the expectation that
another bid will be made at a price higher than the initial offer
(X, < X,), but if no other bid materializes, the market price will
drop to the pre-bid level (M1 < X).95
The stylized shareholder's decision is as follows: when a bid is
made, the shareholder must decide whether to tender (node 1).96 If
the tender offer does not succeed, it is possible that there will be a
second tender offer at a higher price than the first offer. Typically,
95 Id. at 189-94.
9' There is a third possibility not depicted in the trees that enters into the first decision
node: the shareholder can sell in the market instead of tendering. If he exercises that option,
he is certain to receive X,-e, where e is a small positive amount by which the market dis-
counts the stock below the bid price, presumably for the risk that the bid will fail. Although
the market price moves closer to the bid price during the offer period, it does not rise to
equal that price even at the close of the offer. Lucian Bebchuk has emphasized, as the argu-
ment for eliminating this alternative, that no matter how many times the shares change
hands while the bid remains open, the buyer who holds the shares at the time the bid ex-
pires must decide whether or not to tender. See L. Bebchuk, A Model of the Outcome of
Takeover Bids, Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No.
11, at 34 (1985).
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bidders condition their obligation to purchase tendered shares on
the bid's success, but they often acquire the shares even when the
bid fails. To avoid unduly complicating the analysis, I assume that
a losing bidder purchases all tendered shares unless there will be
no subsequent bid. 7 Hence, to reap the benefits of a higher second
offer-to receive Xa-the shareholder must not tender his shares.
If the shareholder does not tender but the offer succeeds, he may
have a second decision to make. If the acquiring firm seeks one
hundred percent control, it typically cashes out the remaining mi-
nority public shareholders in a merger. The second decision is
whether to vote for the merger (node 2). In most instances, the
acquirer will have obtained enough shares through its tender offer
to approve the merger under state law. A no vote, therefore, usu-
ally serves to perfect appraisal rights rather than to block the
transaction. This is modeled by assuming that the merger always
succeeds. The tender offer can be thought of as for fifty percent
plus one share, which gives the acquirer a majority of the stock
and hence control. With a fair price provision, the yes votes needed
for the merger will require more than the acquirer's own shares.
Accordingly, probabilities of success and failure for the merger are
introduced to value the payoffs of the merger decision of the share-
holder whose firm has a fair price provision (figures 2 "and 3).
This is a simple mapping of the decision process, because the
dynamics of competing tenders, as well as the messy bargaining
problem involving n-person coalitions and the formation of coali-
tions among shareholders and bidders, are abstracted away. How-
ever, it captures many of the pivotal features of the decision prob-
lem. The tree can be related to an auction by conceptualizing X as
the highest price offered during the time in which the bid remains
open and the withdrawal rights period under the Williams Act is in
effect.9 8 X. is another firm's bid that is made only after the X1 bid
97 The bidder's information about the likelihood of a late competing bid will not be re-
vealed in the stock price prior to the bid's expiration because the bidder does not make his
decision until after the target shareholders have tendered. This factor may be a reason why
bidders do not precommit themselves concerning the purchase of shares in the event of
defeat.
98 The Williams Act requires bidders to permit tendered shares to be withdrawn at any
time during the first 15 days of the bid. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). The statute extends
the withdrawal rights period only if a competing offer is made prior to the expiration date of
the initial bid.
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expires. A more serious problem related to the bargaining issue is
that the decision trees are a limited illustration of the share-
holder's decision, because that decision is embedded in a super-
game in which the probabilities of the different responses of the
bidder and shareholders are endogenous.9 9 Such an analysis would
be technically difficult, if not impossible, to undertake, and would
so lack the richness of detail called for in policy analysis, that it is
questionable whether any commensurate analytical advantage
would be obtained.
Before working through the decision problem, a final word that
places my use of decision trees in the context of recent scholarship
is in order. William Carney and Lucian Bebchuk have advanced
important explanations of the shareholder's tender decision. Car-
ney structures the payoffs to shareholders from takeovers as a pris-
oner's dilemma game.100 The investor's decision strategy in this
game is always to tender, which is suboptimal because the payoff
from such a strategy is less than the payoff that would be received
if no one tenders and the shareholders as a group hold out for a
higher price. Carney contends that shark repellent amendments
are mechanisms that solve the game's coordination problem and
allow shareholders to reach the more optimal strategy of not
tendering. While I agree with Carney that shark repellent amend-
ments can benefit shareholders by enabling them to reject a bid, in
his model no shareholder would retain shares in the absence of a
shark repellent amendment. Yet in the real world not all bids are
accepted, and this is true whether or not a firm's charter has shark
repellent provisions. Accordingly, it is useful to analyze the prob-
lem with a more realistic payoff structure, to determine when a
strategy of not tendering emerges.
Bebchuk has developed a formal model of the shareholder's deci-
sion that, unlike Carney's, does have an equilibrium strategy in
which shareholders do not tender their shares. To obtain non-
tendering as a unique equilibrium, Bebchuk models the share-
9" Unless the game flips the probabilities in a strange way, my results will be the same as
those in the supergame. An additional caveat along these lines is that in order to obtain
specific decision rules I use average premium values. If these values vary systematically with
firm ownership structure or other characteristics of the target, the results could change in
an undetermined way.
100 See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers:
The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 341.
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holder's choice problem as each investor's having a different valua-
tion of the firm. 01 The shareholder compares his valuation to the
bid and the expected market price if the bid should fail at the
same time that he considers his estimate of other shareholders'
values. I did not adopt this model because I doubt that sharehold-
ers value their shares significantly higher than bidders. I chose in-
stead a model that eliminates the valuation problem and is in the
spirit of the discussion in another article by Bebchuk that focuses
on differences in bid and market prices and probabilities of out-
comes rather than on differences in shareholders' valuations. 0 2
1. Decision When There Is No Shark Repellent Provision
The key to a decision tree is that the sequential analysis works
back from the last decision towards the initial decision.0 3 The first
decision solved is the last decision in the tree. One then moves
backward, discarding the consequences for the alternatives that
one knows will not be chosen to evaluate the particular antecedent
decision node. This is continued until the initial decision is
reached, which is treated like any other decision. For simplicity,
the method for choosing among alternatives that I adopt uses ex-
pected values, which is the same as assuming that shareholders are
risk neutral. 04
Consider the decision portrayed in figure 1 of a shareholder in a
firm without any shark repellent provision. The first decision to
consider is the decision at node 2, the vote on the merger proposal,
which is the final decision in the "do not tender" branch of the
tree. If one of the following assumptions concerning appraisal
rights is made: (1)shareholders will not enforce their appraisal
rights because it is very costly; or (2)the appraisal court will always
choose M2, the market value after a successful bid, as the value of
101 See Bebchuk, supra note 96.
102 See Bebchuk, Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Take-
overs, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (1985).
103 For an excellent textbook on decision anaylsis, see C. Holloway, Decision making
Under Uncertainty: Models and Choices (1979).
104 This is a reasonable assumption that can be justified by portfolio theory-investors
are diversified and hence risk neutral with respect to any one firm. If the outcome of bids is
correlated with market risk, then this justification would be inapposite. My hunch is, how-
ever, that the results of the analysis would not be changed much if I assumed risk aversion.
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Figure 1. Decision when there is no shark repellent provision.
the stock, then this is a straightforward decision because of pure
outcome dominance-M 2 is less than X2. The decision rule is vote
yes.
If it is assumed, instead, that appraisal rights will be exercised
and there is a positive probability, 1-h, that the appraisal court
will value the shares at X1, then the shareholder votes yes or no on
the merger depending on the value of h. By introducing an addi-
tional assumption concerning the relative value of M2, one can
solve explicitly for the critical value of h. I adopt the assumption,
based on the stock v~lue of target firms that are not merged out,
that:
(1) M2 = .59X205
105 See Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial,
and Two-Tier Tender Offers 19 (Apr. 19, 1985) [hereinafter cited as SEC, Partials Study]
(on average, premium in second step is 44.8% above market price; per share value of first
step is 15.7% greater than per share value of second step).
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The decision rule is vote yes if h is greater than .34; vote no if h is
less than .34. If the maximum value the appraisal court finds is
greater than X,, the cutoff value of h is higher. To simplify the
presentation, the calculations for all the decisions in each tree are
provided in the appendix. For the discussion in the text, I assume
that X1 is the maximum amount the appraisal court will award; in
the appendix I include the adjustments to the decision rule when
the maximum amount is X3, which is higher than X.. The adjust-
ments are, for the most part, trivial.
From this resolution of the decision at node 2, one moves back
to the decision at node 1, to tender or not, and compares the out-
comes of tendering with those of not tendering and voting yes or
voting no. To determine the optimal choice in this case, some addi-
tional assumptions concerning the values of the payoffs must be
introduced. Again, all values used are derived from the empirical
research on acquisitions.
(2) X2 = .86X,106
(3) Mi = .61X,107
(4) X, = 1.17X 1'0
If h > .34, so the shareholder votes yes (which is equivalent to
the rollback in the case where appraisal rights are not exercised),
the shareholder tenders if .14p > .34a or, substituting for a, which
equals (1-p)/3, the shareholder tenders if p > .45. If h < .34, so
he voted no, then the shareholder tenders if .4lph > .34a. Since
h < .34, the critical value for p here is always greater than its
value when the shareholder votes yes. The closer h is to .34, the
closer the critical value of p is to .45. As h decreases, the critical
value of p increases. For example, if h = .1, then the shareholder
tenders if p > .73. The more likely the appraisal court is to value
the shares at XI, which is greater than the market price, M,, the
less likely the shareholder is to tender his shares.
One permutation of figure 1 needs to be considered. There is a
"0I See Id. (on average, per share value of first step is 15.7 percent greater than per share
value of second step).
107 See Id. (first-tier average premium 62.8%). I use this premium to determine M1 be-
cause when there is no subsequent acquisition the share price reverts to the market price
before the initial bid. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 94, at 189-94.
108 See Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J. L. & Econ. 151, 168-69 (1985) (auction results in average gain of 17% over
initial bid).
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question concerning what happens to the decision if the share-
holder sees through to the blended premium, that is, he under-
stands that half of his shares will be purchased at X1 and the re-
maining half at X2. Consider first the case when h > .34, so that
the optimal choice is vote yes on the merger. When the shareholder
recognizes that not all his shares will receive the higher first-step
price, the decision rule changes to tender if p > .86. Thus the cut-
off probability used for deciding to tender nearly doubles when the
shareholder recognizes that he will receive X1 for only half of his
shares, and accordingly, there are more cases in which the choice of
not tendering is optimal, so he is more likely not to tender. Be-
cause the shareholder realizes that he will actually receive less than
X, if the tender succeeds, the higher possibility of receiving X.
from another bidder weighs more importantly in his decision than
the less likely downside risk of getting only Mi. In the case where
h < .34, so that the shareholder votes no on the merger, the deci-
sion rule when the blended premium is recognized changes to
tender if ph > 1.34a/.205. The right-hand side of this equation is
always greater than the right-hand side of the equation of the deci-
sion rule for h < .34 when the shareholder does not see through
to the blended premium, which was tender if ph > .34a/.41 (that
is, 6.53a > .829a).
Hence, the direction of change is the same in both decision
problems: the cases in which a shareholder will not tender increase
when the blended premium is taken into account. However, these
results follow only from maintaining the assumption that X, does
not decline proportionately to seventeen percent above the
blended premium of .5(X 1 + X.), rather than seventeen percent
above X, If X. is so adjusted, and there is no reason to assume
that the subsequent bid does not involve such a response, recogni-
tion of the blended premium would have no effect on the decision
rule. I follow this convention for the rest of the paper and ignore
the blended values.109
109 All results carry through if a blended premium is used. I calculated the decision rules
for all of the trees using a value for X, that was equal to the average blended premium of
approximately fifty percent, see SEC, Partials Study, supra note 105, and found no signifi-
cant change in any of the decision rule choices.
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2. Decision When There Is a Fair Price Rule
Figure 2 depicts the decision for a shareholder when a firm has a
fair price provision in its charter. The success of the merger is
Figure 2. Decision when there is a fair price rule.
no longer certain because the votes of the acquirer's own shares
will not be sufficient for approval. The payoff M2, the trading
price of the shares after a successful bid if the merger is rejected,
can also be interpreted as the payoff shareholders receive when
neither a supermajority vote nor payment of a fair price is neces-
sary because management has approved the transaction. This
would imply that management and the bidder split the difference
between X2 and M2. As before, the merger vote depends on h: the
shareholder votes yes if h > .34 and no if h < .34. Similarly,
under the assumption that appraisal rights are not exercised, he
always votes yes.
The interesting question is to compare the tender decision con-
tingent on each of the two possible merger votes to the tender de-
cision when there is no fair price provision. The strongest argu-
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ment against shark repellent amendments is their disincentive
effect on target shareholders to tender, and derivatively, on bid-
ding firms to make acquisitions. As Sanford Grossman and Oliver
Hart have demonstrated, a level price rule may have undesirable
incentive effects on shareholders because of inertia-there is little
reason for shareholders to tender rather than to wait and see what
develops because they will receive the same price in any event.110
As a result, the probability that a bid will fail is increased, and this
effect, Grossman and Hart maintain, will feed back into the mar-
ket for corporate control such that the number of initial acquisi-
tion attempts will decrease.
When h > .34 and the optimal choice is to vote yes on the
merger, the decision to tender is a function of the relative values of
the probabilities. Namely, the rule is to tender if p > .34a/(1-
.86q-.59r-s). This result can be compared to the decision rule with-
out a fair price provision, which was tender if p > .34a/.14. The
shareholder's decision is the same if 1-.86q-.59r-s = .14. If the ex-
pression on the left-hand side is less than .14, the shareholder will
be less likely to tender when there is a fair price rule in place than
without one, because he tenders when the probability of the bid's
success, p, is greater than .34a divided by this value, and the
smaller the value of the expression compared to .14, the fewer val-
ues p can take for which the decision rule to tender holds. Another
way of interpreting the results is to see that the fair price rule has
no effect when 1.9r = s, the likelihood of paying a fair price is
about twice the likelihood of not merging. If r < .53s, sharehold-
ers will tender less frequently with a fair price rule than without
one. The expectation of receiving X, as a floor leads the share-
holder not to tender in the hope of realizing X.
When h < .34 and the optimal choice is to vote no on the
merger, the decision rule is to tender if p > .34a/(.41r + .41qh).
The fair price provision has no effect on the shareholder's decision
when the merger vote is no, if .41r + .41qh = .41h, or, r = [h/
(1-h)]s. If the left-hand side is less than the right-hand side, the
shareholder will tender less frequently with a fair price
rule-because h < .34, the right-hand side can be no more than
.51s. Shareholders favor a rule, then, depending upon the likeli-
11O See Grossman & Hart, supra note 24; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 Yale L. J. 698, 710-11 (1982).
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hood of the bidder's courses of action. In both cases, vote yes and
vote no, if s is more than about two times r, the shareholder ten-
ders less frequently with a fair price rule than without one.
These results show when it is more likely that a shareholder will
not tender with a fair price rule in place than without one. They
are the conditions under which the inertia argument holds. The
analysis suggests that a fair price provision does not always imply
an inertia effect. Without information on the probabilities, in par-
ticular the probability of bidders' reactions, one cannot conclude
that these provisions definitely affect the probability of a bid's
success and hence the likelihood of the occurrence of the initial bid
for the particular firm or of bids in general. But in fairness to
Grossman and Hart, the fair price rule they envisioned is not what
shareholders actually adopt but rather one similar to a redemption
rights statute. In their model they assume the bidder must always
pay X1 in the second step. The reason why the shareholder some-
times tenders in my analysis is because the bidder need not always
pay the fair price.
A question that the decision tree analysis does not address is
how X1 (the price per share of the first-tier tender offer) compares
under the different rules. If a bidder has only a fixed sum to pay
for a target's shares, the level price X. paid for a firm with a fair
price provision will be less than the X. and more than the X2 (the
price per share in the second-tier merger) paid to a firm without
the rule. The bidder thereby pays the same aggregate amount in
either case. In this scenario, the primary effect of a fair price pro-
vision is distributional, and it might not affect the frequency of
bids.""" On the other side, because the fair price provision might
reduce the incentive to tender, the bidder might still have to offer
a higher X1, such that the difference between X1 and X. (the price
offered by a competing bidder if the bid fails) is small, to ensure
that shareholders tender. The probability of a takeover would be
reduced if the value of X, that was necessary for the tender offer
to succeed with a fair price provision compared to that without
such a rule would make the acquisition unprofitable. In such mar-
"' Cf. J. Pound, The Impact of Antitakeover Charter Amendments on Contests for Cor-
porate Control (Investor Responsibility Research Center 1985) (firms with shark repellent
provisions have lower frequency of takeover bid and similar premium size as firms with no
provisions).
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ginal cases, the shareholder considering a fair price rule has to
weigh the reduction in the firm's probability of being the object of
a bid in the presence of the rule against the decreased likelihood of
receiving a premium for his shares in the absence of the rule.
Without knowing the magnitude of the decline in probabilities
and of the difference in offering prices, it is not possible to deter-
mine the optimal decision, except for shareholders for whom the
likelihood of receiving a premium in the first step is almost certain.
For such an investor, it is unambiguously better not to have the
rule because he always receives the bid premium and there will be
no decrease in the possibility of a bid. A fair price rule could lower
the return of these investors. Part B examines more systematically
who such shareholders may be.
But there is a further complication: The adoption of a fair price
charter provision may bring the firm to the attention of bidders,
and thereby increase the likelihood of a bid.112 In this circum-
stance, the aforementioned shareholder might not disapprove of
the provision. Moreover, to the extent that a fair price provision
reduces the risk of not tendering and enables a shareholder to wait
for a higher competing bid, and if the effect on the frequency of an
initial bid is small, then these shareholders may again benefit from
such a provision. At the other end of the spectrum, for sharehold-
ers for whom the probability of receiving a premium in the first
step is close to zero, the decreased likelihood of a tender offer obvi-
ously has less impact on the value of their shares. Part B will con-
sider the identity of this set of shareholders and will indicate when
we might expect them to conclude that a fair price rule is to their
benefit.
3. Fair Price Rule When Decision Affects the Probability of the
Merger
Figure 3 changes the assumption of price-taking, that the share-
holder's vote does not affect the outcome of the merger. It illus-
trates the decision tree for a shareholder, owning shares in a firm
with a fair price rule, whose decision affects the probabilities of the
"2 This signaling thesis is the explanation that would be offered for the typical finding
that the adoption of shark repellent amendments has no statistically significant negative
effect on share prices by those who believe that such provisions harm shareholders. See
Romano, supra note 6, at 270-71.
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outcomes. In this scenario, a decision to vote no decreases the like-
lihood of the bidder's success and a decision to vote yes increases
the likelihood of the bidder's success. This impact is plausible
Figure 3. Fair price rule, decision affects outcome.
even for a shareholder with relatively small holdings because of the
supermajority vote requirement for the combination. Given the
typical turnout of votes in publicly-traded corporations of between
seventy and eighty percent of the outstanding shares, an eighty
percent, two-thirds disinterested shares rule is, in effect, a require-
ment approaching unanimity. Recognizing this, a simplifying as-
sumption is adopted:
(5) If the shareholder votes no on the merger with a fair price rule,
q = 0. If he votes yes, q = 1.
The rationale for making a symmetric assumption concerning a
yes vote's effect on the merger's success follows the logic of a Nash
equilibrium: all marginal shareholders face the same decision tree,
know they are the swing vote, and consequently make the same
choice. Thus, voting yes means the merger will succeed. For techni-
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cal convenience, I assign to the payoffs of M. and X1 the probabili-
ties, respectively, of r + nq and s + (1-n)q, when the merger is
rejected.
Working backward through the tree, the decision rule is, if nq,
the relative amount by which r, the probability of no combination,
increases, is greater than .34-r, vote yes; if it is less, vote no. When
nq > .34-r and the shareholder votes yes, the decision rule for
tendering is the same as that with no fair price provision(figure 1).
The two trees are the same, because voting yes now assures receiv-
ing X2, just as it did with no shark repellent amendment when the
bidder's shares controlled the merger outcome. When nq < .34-r
and the shareholder votes no, the shareholder tenders if p > .34a/
(.41r + .41nq). In this case, the decision to tender is the same as
that without a fair price rule when r + nq = h. Therefore, if
r + nq > h, the shareholder tenders more with a fair price rule
than without one. If n = h, the decision rule is the same with a
fair price rule whether or not the shareholder's no vote affects the
merger outcome.
4. Decision When There Is a Plain Supermajority Rule
To ensure that its bid succeeds, the bidder might threaten that
it will not undertake the merger if it has to pay more than X2. In
the extreme case where s = 0, we are, in effect, dealing with a
plain supermajority provision. Figures 4 and 5 portray the decision
rule when the shark repellent device is solely the supermajority
component of a fair price provision. In brief, when a no vote stops
the merger, the shareholder always votes yes because the merger
entails a premium above the market value of the shares (figure 4).
This is a case of pure outcome dominance identical to the merger
decision with no shark repellent amendment and no exercise of ap-
praisal rights. The shareholder tenders if .14p > .34a, which is
the same decision rule as the rule applied when there is no shark
repellent amendment. When a no vote does not necessarily cause
the merger to be rejected and appraisal rights are available to the
dissenter, (figure 5), the shareholder votes yes when
h > r + s + .35q. This means that, all other things being
1987]
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Figure 4. Supermajority rule, decision affects outcome.
Figure 5. Decision when there is a plain supermajority rule.
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equal, shareholders will approve the second step merger in more
cases with a plain supermajority rule than with a fair price rule or
no shark repellent amendment, when 1-.65q < .34.
To see the effect of the supermajority provision on the tender
decision, I compare first the decision rule for the case when the
shareholder votes yes on the merger. The optimal choice is to
tender if p > .34a/(.41-.27q). The shareholder will tender more
frequently with a supermajority rule than when such a rule is part
of a fair price package if .41-.27q > 1-.86q-.59r-s. Substituting
and rearranging terms, this reduces to 1.6s > s, and the share-
holder always tenders more frequently with a supermajority provi-
sion than with a fair price rule. He will tender more frequently
with a supermajority rule than with no shark repellent at all if .41-
.27q > .14. For the case when the shareholder votes no and the
vote does not guarantee that the merger fails, the shareholder ten-
ders if .4lph > .34a, which is the same decision rule as the one
with no shark repellent amendment. The shareholder will therefore
tender more frequently when there is a plain supermajority provi-
sion than when a supermajority provision is accompanied by a fair
price option if he votes yes to the merger, and if he votes no and
r < [h/(1-h)]s.
The result suggests that shareholders might be better off with a
fair price provision than with a supermajority provision, assuming
that shareholders benefit from not tendering. This effect supports
a learning explanation of why plain supermajority provisions have
become less popular over time and have been replaced with
supermajority requirements that are attached to fair price rules. Of
course, in the case of a plain supermajority provision, when the
requisite vote of approval is not obtained, nothing stops the bidder
from simply raising its merger price up to the fair price X" and
seeking another vote.
Despite the likely reduction in shares tendered, bidders might
also prefer a fair price provision to an unadorned supermajority
clause. The fair price option offers the bidder who desires one hun-
dred percent control a way to avoid a supermajority vote that in-
creases the holdout power of a small number of shareholders. If the
bidder pays X1, it does not need to attain a supermajority's ap-
proval of the merger, and its own controlling shares will be enough
1987]
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to consummate the transaction. 113 There is also the option of ob-
taining management's approval, which presumably is exercised if it
costs less than paying the X2 < X, that attracts sufficient shares.
One can safely assume that the bidder will choose the cheapest
course of action, under a fair price provision, from among ob-
taining board approval, shareholder approval, or paying the fair
price.
From this perspective, a fair price provision may reduce the
transaction costs of an acquisition rather than, as is commonly pre-
sumed, increase those costs. The bidder does not have to worry
about the price it must pay in the second step. All it has to pay is
X., the price the shareholders have agreed to accept in advance in
the fair price clause. Negotiation and litigation costs are thereby
substantially reduced. In this setting, it is unlikely that a share-
holder would receive more than X, in an appraisal proceeding and,
presumably, shareholders are aware of this and will be less likely to
pursue such a remedy when the terms of the fair price provision
are fulfilled. The clause thus provides a ceiling, rather than a floor,
for the purchase price.
5. Decision When the Firm Is Subject to a Redemption Rights or
Control Share Acquisition Provision
Some straightforward comparisons can be made between fair
price provisions and redemption rights and control share acquisi-
tion statutes. These statutes resemble different features that are
combined in a fair price provision. Because these statutes are trig-
gered by acquisitive transactions regardless of a two-step structure,
I discuss the shareholder's decision problem for both statutes as
consisting of one decision on tendering. However, the decision
rules are unchanged if the problem is depicted as a two-tier offer
entailing two decisions, tendering and voting on a second-step
merger (see figures 6a and 7b and appendix).
A redemption rights scheme is equivalent to a mandatory fair
price requirement. The payoff that the shareholder receives if he
does not tender and the bid succeeds is certain to be Xi. Figure 6
113 This advantage would not be available if, as is commonly claimed, the bidder makes a
two-tier offer because it cannot obtain the financing to pay cash for all the shares, which
means that in the second step the bidder must use securities that will sell below their face
value such that X. < X,.
164 [Vol. 73:111
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illustrates the decision problem for a shareholder in a firm subject
to a redemption rights statute. As long as there is a positive prob-
Figure 6. Decision when there is a redemption rights rule.
Figure 6a. Redemption rights rule and a two-tier offer.
Note: The decision rule is still do not tender (shareholder always
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ability that an appraisal court may value the shares at less than
X1 (h > 0), the shareholder will always exercise his redemption
right against the acquirer rather than go to court for an appraisal,
as the statutes permit, when the maximum the court will award is
X, The provision exacerbates the inertia effect of a fair price pro-
vision on shareholder decisions: the decision choice is always do
not tender. This is because the shareholder can do no worse by not
tendering, and he can possibly do better because he retains the
opportunity of participating in a higher subsequent offer. This is,
in fact, the Grossman and Hart result.
A control share acquisition statute is similar to a supermajority
provision because, as interested shares are excluded from voting on
the control transaction, a smaller number of shares than a majority
determine the outcome of a bid. Figures 7 and 7a portray the deci-
sion problem for a shareholder in a firm operating under such a
statute. In contrast to the other rules, under most control share
Figure 7. Decision when there is a control share acquisition rule
with appraisal rights.
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Figure 7a. Decision when there is a control share acquisition
rule with no appraisal rights.
Vote
Figure 7b. Control share acquisition rule and a two-tier offer.
Note: The decision rule is still always vote yes.
1987]
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  167 1987
168 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 73:111
acquisition regimes the bidder cannot acquire the shares if the bid
fails (if less than a majority of the shares votes in favor of the ac-
quisition).114 The probabilities and payoffs of tendering are modi-
fied accordingly in offsetting ways-the probability of receiving X,
is decreased and the possibility of receiving X3 is introduced. In
addition, appraisal rights are granted to dissenters from an ap-
proved control share acquisition only in some states. Accordingly,
figure 7 represents the decision problem when appraisal rights ex-
ist and figure 7a when they do not. The decision rule is the same in
the two situations. The control share acquisition provision magni-
fies the effects discussed in the previous section on supermajority
provisions, that the shareholder tenders more frequently with such
a rule than with a fair price rule. The decision is always vote yes,
unless, as detailed in the appendix, the assumption concerning the
appraisal court's award is altered to allow the maximum amount to
be X., which is higher than X,.
This decision rule is unchanged even in the case where the
shareholder's decision affects the outcome (figure 8), assuming,
consistent with the analysis throughout, that the relative likelihood
of receiving M, compared to X3 remains the same. If the probabili-
ties are adjusted more generally by adding np to the likelihood of
no subsequent bid and (1-n)p to that of receiving a subsequent
bid, then the shareholder always tenders if n > .333. If n < .333,
then the decision to tender depends on whether p > -.0166/(.56n-
.1866).
There is a significant difference between these statutes and a
fair price provision, a difference that was touched upon in the dis-
cussion of supermajority clauses. Both the control share acquisi-
tion and redemption rights statutes offer no alternative options to
bidders except, respectively, either to win a supermajority vote or
to pay the fair redemption price, if they wish to gain control. The
fair price statute, by contrast, gives the bidder more choice-it can
win a supermajority vote, pay a fair price, gain management's ap-
proval, or be content with an acquisition of less than one hundred
percent. In this respect, bidders might prefer a fair price regime to
all others because it gives them the greatest flexibility in structur-
114 In some regimes the shares may be purchased but are stripped of voting rights; the net
result will be the same: The bidder will not acquire the shares because non-voting shares are
of no value to a bidder for control.
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ing acquisitive transactions.




A corollary is that a fair price statute should impact less heavily
on the frequency of initial bids than either of the other statutes
because, by giving bidders more room in which to maneuver, it
does less to discourage control changes. If so, this would probably
be the most important reason for the popularity of fair price provi-
sions in charters and with legislators. However, the decision tree
analysis provides mixed support for this contention. While it im-
plies that shareholders may tender less frequently under a redemp-
tion rights regime than a fair price regime, it also suggests the
counterintuitive result that shareholders may tender more fre-
quently under a control share acquisition statute than a fair price
provision.
This describes a bidder's preference schedule among statutes as:
control share acquisition, fair price, redemption rights. Qualifying
the bidder's preference for a control share acquisition regime may
be the fact that under most versions of the law the bidder cannot
acquire any shares if the offer is rejected by the shareholders. The
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bidder can do so under the other statutes, which do not affect the
current contractual basis of the purchase obligation in the case of a
failed bid.
It might appear peculiar that the most popular shark repellent
charter amendment and takeover statute, a fair price provision, is
less restrictive of bidders' actions and thereby less likely to dis-
courage a takeover attempt than the other defensive strategies.
But the decision analysis suggests an explanation. Shareholders
who vote on shark repellent amendments may be consciously con-
cerned about the tradeoff in the frequency of initial bids against
the size (or distribution) of bid premiums. Investors may be willing
to sustain some decrease in the probability that their firm will be
taken over in order to achieve a particular level of certainty con-
cerning the premium they will receive: They choose the tactic that
seems to have the smallest impact on the probability of a bid,
while retaining some possibility of exercising the option to gamble
on a higher premium. For fair price provisions encourage the
shareholder to retain shares some, but not all, of the time. This
explanation is at odds with the contention of Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel that the ex ante decision of all shareholders
would be to ban all defensive tactics so as to maximize the likeli-
hood of takeover bids." 5 The point is explored further in the next
section, which examines under what conditions shareholders would
voluntarily support fair price provisions.
B. When Might Investors Decide to Support a Fair Price
Provision?
The analysis of shareholder decisions under fair price provisions
suggests an important question: why don't all firms-and all
states-adopt such a rule? I explore in this section an explanation
of the variation across firms that is based upon the notion that not
all shareholders will reach the same conclusion concerning fair
price provisions. The key feature on which I rely is that these pro-
visions do not affect all shareholders equally because of the tech-
niques bidders employ to obtain control and the differences in in-
formation that shareholders possess concerning acquisitive
I'l See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981). Bebchuk also disputes Easterbrook and
Fischel's thesis, on normative grounds. See Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 1784.
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transactions. It would, accordingly, be in the interest of some
shareholders, but not all, to support a fair price amendment.11 A
further implication is that the statutes may have real bite for some
firms yet be uncontroversial for others, depending on the firm's
ownership composition.
1. Acquisitive Techniques and Shareholder Information Costs
Before developing the scenario in which some shareholders de-
sire a fair price provision, it will be helpful to introduce one of the
most successful techniques for acquiring control, the three-stage
offer. The sequence is as follows: a negotiated private purchase,
typically for cash, of a block of stock, followed by a cash tender
offer, at the same price, either for any-or-all shares or for control,
and lastly, a cash merger of the target company into a subsidiary
of the acquirer, giving it one hundred percent control. 1 7 If the
same price per share is paid in each of the three stages it would
not matter to target shareholders at which stage they cash in their
holdings. But if the price is lower in the third stage than in the
second, and if not all shares are tendered in the second stage, then
those who tender will receive more per share than those who give
up their stock in the merger.
The negotiated purchases in the first step of the transaction are
made either from a controlling shareholder if there is one, or from
a large, usually institutional, noncontrolling shareholder or a col-
lection of such investors. The purchases are typically made at a
substantial premium above market with a most-favored-nation
116 My thesis is therefore different from Carney's prisoners' dilemma analysis, for it does
not distinguish among shareholders in the evaluation of the desirability of shark repellent
devices. See Carney, supra note 100. In a recent article, Carney refines his position. While
his analysis of shareholder decisions is unchanged, he also maintains, as I do in this article,
that institutional and individual investors will disagree on shark repellent amendments. See
Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 Midland Corp. Fin. J. 48, 53
(1986). My analysis is also distinct from Bebchuk's; although he emphasizes the differential
effect of acquisitions on different types of shareholders, he advocates one rule for all firms,
which differs from the provisions that firms voluntarily adopt. See Bebchuk, supra note 102,
at 1244-52. Moreover, my explanation of shark repellent amendments is contrary to Gilson's
critique of these provisions. I suggest that shareholders can benefit from fair price proposals
precisely because they enable investors to realize information-cost savings. Cf. Gilson, supra
note 89.
117 Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated
Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. Law. 1679, 1683-84 (1979).
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clause in the contract, by which the purchaser promises to pay the
seller the highest price it pays to any subsequent seller in the first
or second step.118 Bidders frequently resort to this tactic because
the nonpublic purchases in the first step facilitate a control change
by enabling the bidder to gain a leg up on potential competitors,
including incumbent management. This technique suggests the
linchpin for my explanation of the choice of adopting a fair price
provision: because of their position, institutions or individuals with
large blocks of stock rarely miss out on a premium. Not only are
these investors often approached in the early stages of an acquisi-
tion, which gives them access to nonpublic information concerning
bids, but also, because there are economies of scale in obtaining
information-the fixed costs are spread over more shares-they
will engage in their own efforts at generating information on the
I18 A well-known use of this technique was Sun Company's attempt to acquire Becton
Dickinson Corporation. The facts are detailed in Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
805-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
Sun solicited 30 institutions with an offer of either a top final price of $45 per share or a
price of $40 with a most-favored-nation guarantee. The solicitation was conditioned on
Sun's obtaining 20% of Becton's stock and was undertaken after the stock exchange had
closed for the day. The institutions were asked to respond within an hour, though some were
given until the following day. The idea was to accumulate a substantial block of stock before
the market reopened to ensure a successful public takeover. Sun obtained over 30% of Bec-
ton's shares by this method.
I cite this case only as a sharp illustration of the technique. Sun's activities were found to
have violated the Williams Act. The purchases were held to constitute a tender offer, and
therefore, Sun had to comply with the Act in order for the offer to proceed. Id. at 817-26.
The technique has not been questioned for smaller accumulations. The important point is
that it demonstrates a key transactional feature for a successful bid: the pivotal, initial role
of institutional investors and individuals with large blocks of stock.
Recent events continue to bolster this point. Campeau Corporation, for instance, was able
to acquire control of Allied Stores by privately purchasing a block of shares assembled by
Jefferies & Company after Campeau withdrew a public tender offer. Judge to Rule on Ac-
quisition of Allied Stake, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 3, col. 1. In addition, the insider-
trading scandal involving arbitrageur Ivan Boesky, see Spreading Scandal: Fall of Ivan Bo-
esky Leads to Broader Probe of Inside Information, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6,
suggests further techniques that aggravate information disparities between institutions and
individual and large and small investors. Investment banks appear to have aided acquiring
firms, as well as themselves, by tipping selected arbitrageurs on impending bids so that
blocks of stock would be in friendly hands. The practice may well be widespread. Not only
have the information-equalizing Williams Act 13D filing requirements that disclose 5% in-
terests been circumvented by the practice, but the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's premerger noti-
fication requirements have also been evaded as investment banks have purchased and held
shares for bidders, thereby avoiding the need for compliance on the ground that the direct
owner of the shares has investment, and not merger, as its purpose. See Takeovers Scruti-
nized by FTC, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1986, at D1, col. 6.
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outcomes of bids and will be better informed than investors with
smaller holdings.119
These factors suggest that the most obvious impact of a fair
price requirement is its function as a small shareholder protection
provision. Common wisdom has it that such shareholders are less
likely to tender their shares than larger and more sophisticated in-
vestors. In addition, small shareholders are not approached by a
bidder who seeks to accumulate a block before it makes a public
offer, nor are they contacted directly during the bid. Accordingly,
they are more likely to be the ones who are cashed out in the final
merger stage of an acquisition. One does not have to attribute irra-
tionality or idiosyncratic valuation of shares as the reason for the
failure of small shareholders to tender, but rather, greater costs in
obtaining information about the transaction. Moreover, not all of
the larger investors' private information will be impounded in the
stock price during the bid in time to be of use to smaller share-
holders, because most institutions tender just as the bid is about to
expire.12 0 In this scenario, a fair price provision is a mechanism for
equalizing information, and thereby the price received, across
shareholders.
A fair price provision can be characterized as a device for enforc-
"' For instance, if not all shareholders know that the merger price will be less than the
tender price, some may not tender. As a consequence, the tendered shares will receive more
than their pro rata share of the premium, even in a partial offer that is oversubscribed.
Institutions that are sophisticated repeat players, and are often contacted by tenderors dur-
ing the public offer period if they are not approached initially in the private purchase stage,
are knowledgeable about the typical terms of acquisitions, the likelihood of success, and the
possible differential between tender and merger prices.
120 This is another instance where transaction costs and economies of scale matter. Insti-
tutions can wait until the last minute to tender their shares. Last minute tenders are expen-
sive because special messengers must be used to ensure the timely delivery of the shares or
guaranteed delivery and transmittal letters. Most small individual shareholders or stock re-
tailers cannot afford to follow such a strategy and, as a result, they tender earlier on in the
bid. If it looks like a higher bid will be forthcoming when the bid expires, larger sharehold-
ers and institutions are more likely to retain their shares and participate in that later offer
than smaller shareholders.
Small shareholders could sell in the market at the last possible minute rather than tender,
and thereby obtain more information, as revealed in the market price, concerning the bid.
But even without data as to whether they follow such a strategy, there are several obvious
disadvantages: The stock market closes many hours before a bid typically expires, thus lim-
iting how much information will be revealed, and the price received by selling will be less
than the price received by tendering.
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ing the rule prohibiting the payment of a non-pro rata dividend'21
in the context of a liquidating distribution of the proceeds of a
takeover, but the logic or desirability of the provision has to do
with information costs. A fair price rule reduces information costs
for small shareholders because they need not become informed
about the terms of the deal to guarantee that they receive the best
price that informed shareholders obtain. On the other side, large
shareholders who are most likely to tender into two-tier bids and
obtain a disproportionate share of the premium would be the least
predisposed to favor a fair price rule. They benefit from the dis-
proportionate distribution of the premium and consequently, any
negative effect the provision might have on bid frequency will
dominate their decision. Of course, the reason why these investors
receive a higher premium is precisely because not all of the other
shareholders tender.
The decision tree diagrams can provide some further insight into
who benefits from fair price provisions. For example, the decision
tree in which the shareholder's vote affects the outcome (figure 3)
can be interpreted as the decision of a large shareholder or in-
formed institutional investors who as a group have a large block of
stock, for in these cases it is likely that the way the investor acts
will determine the outcome. That is part of the source of the infor-
mational advantage: bidders are anxious to contact investors with
a block of stock because their support is crucial for the success of
the bid.
The analysis indicates that when the optimal decision for the
merger is to vote yes, the shareholder's decision is unchanged by
the insertion of a fair price rule. This means that large sharehold-
ers will tender more frequently than small shareholders when 1-
.86q-.59r-s < .14. When the optimal merger decision is to vote no,
these shareholders tender more frequently with the fair price rule
than without it when r + nq > h, that is, when the probability
of the bidder taking no action exceeds the probability of an ap-
praisal court adopting the low valuation. In comparison to small
"I See cases collected in V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance: Cases and
Materials 416-35 (2d ed. 1980). Although Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985), appears to undermine the longstanding pro rata dividend rule, the court did not
view the issue as one of distribution policy and characterized it as a defensive tactic, treat-
ing Mesa in its status as bidder and not as a target shareholder.
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shareholders, when the merger vote is no, large shareholders would
tender more frequently than small ones if n > h (the proportion-
ate effect of the shareholder's action on the no merger outcome is
greater than the probability of an appraisal court adopting the low
valuation). Because small shareholders are unlikely to seek ap-
praisal rights since the cost of using the procedure will be spread
over only a small number of shares, h is close to 1 (M2 is what the
shareholder receives if he does not go to court). Yet n might not be
close to 1 even if the large shareholder has a sizeable block because
n measures the bidder's reaction to the shareholders' vote. (The
larger n is, the less likely the bidder pays the fair price.) Thus, it
seems probable that n < h, and small shareholders tender more
often than large ones in the presence of a fair price rule. In this
regard, the rule helps the small investor by making it more likely
that he will receive the higher premium at the front-end of the
acquisition, although it is also true that the nontendering larger
investors hope to receive that same price at the second step, while
retaining the opportunity to receive the higher X3 if the bid fails.
This analysis suggests a potentially strong equalizing effect of the
rule. It also indicates under what circumstances large shareholders
are indifferent to, or do not gain from, a fair price provision.
In addition, we can view the decision of a shareholder confronted
with the truncated decision tree of only node 2 of figure 2 as de-
picting the extreme case of an uninformed shareholder's decision.
This is a shareholder who did not have the chance to decide
whether or not to tender and thus to give up X consciously in the
hope of receiving X3.122 Such a shareholder can receive X, only
when a fair price rule is in place; otherwise the maximum he can
receive is X2. The welfare of this individual can be improved by
the addition of a fair price provision under the following condi-
tions. When the shareholder votes yes, if 2.9r < 1-q, or when the
shareholder votes no, if h > r + qh (the probability of receiving
M2 is greater without than with the rule), the expected value of
112 The most common and plausible explanations for untendered shares are that the own-
ers (1) are away on vacation and either do not learn of the bid or cannot tender their shares
in time; (2) do not know they own the stock; (3) are deceased; or (4) do not understand the
transmittal letter and do not have a broker or lawyer who can explain it to them. Small
shareholders are most likely to fit in these categories. For example, given the size of their
holdings, the costs of remedying the situation in (1) or (4) may well outweigh the value of
the premium they would receive for their shares.
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what the shareholder receives under a fair price rule is greater
than the expected value without the rule. Hence, shareholders who
are not informed about a tender, or, to put it another way, those
for whom it would be costly to tender, benefit from a fair price rule
under these conditions.
2. Ownership Composition and Fair Price Provisions
The differential distribution of acquisition premiums among
shareholders and the offsetting effects of fair price provisions sug-
gest that the likelihood that a firm will voluntarily adopt a fair
price provision is affected by the composition of the firm's share-
holders, for shareholders who have differing access to information
on bids have different interests with respect to these provisions.
The significant feature for analysis is the concentration of stock
ownership, because concentration measures how the voting popula-
tion is distributed, and accordingly, whether a fair price provision
would be easily adopted.
Barry Baysinger and Henry Butler have also recently offered an
explanation for why some firms adopt shark repellent amendments
and others do not."'3 They stress established relations with man-
agement, and not information costs, as the source of heterogeneity
in shareholders' interests leading to the differential pattern of
charter provisions across firms. The shareholders who they assert
to be the advocates of shark repellent amendments are not, how-
ever, the beneficiaries among investors indicated by my analysis, or
by the available data.12 4 The reason for the analytical discrepancy
is that their analysis does not look at the content and operation of
shark repellent amendments, and in particular, that of the most
popular provision, a fair price rule. They focus instead on one po-
tential result of such provisions, that a takeover's success can be
thwarted. Taking the substance of the amendments into account
weakens the plausibility of their story even more than the notion
that shares of stock have idiosyncratic value to investors. Insid-
ers-shareholders with established relations with management-do
not clearly benefit from the most common amendment, a fair price
123 See Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1257 (1985).
"2 See supra note 89, discussing institutional investor voting patterns on shark repellent
amendments.
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provision, compared to other types of tactics such as a plain
supermajority rule. Rather, small shareholders with no special rela-
tion to the firm are the beneficiaries of these provisions.
The perspective of each type of shareholder, classified by hold-
ing size as a fairly accurate proxy for access to information and
likelihood of participation in a bid premium, can be simply out-
lined. Small shareholders, who benefit most from a fair price rule,
will typically favor such a rule but will succeed in enacting one
only in the context of a specific constellation of stock ownership.
Owners of blocks of stock who are not managers will have little
interest in fair price provisions because they are likely to receive a
premium for their shares, and their gain is, in fact, higher if the
acquirer's payment is non-pro rata. If the large shareholder is a
manager, then the supermajority component of a fair price rule
may be of greater value: if the bidder cannot pay the fair price, the
manager-shareholder might be able to veto a merger with the votes
of his own shares and thereby retain control.12 5
To the extent that fair price provisions lessen the risk of adopt-
ing the strategy of not tendering in order to receive a better offer,
then even these larger shareholders could benefit from such a pro-
vision. However, as the decision tree analysis suggests, fair price
provisions often have no impact on large shareholders' decisions, a
factor that might lead at best to indifference rather than opposi-
tion or support. The position of medium-scale investors on fair
price provisions is ambiguous, because a shareholder's position is
determined in relation to the holdings of the firm's other investors.
The medium shareholder's information may enable him to gain a
bigger premium than smaller shareholders receive, but he would be
in the opposite position when the comparison is with larger
shareholders.
Although shareholders clearly possess different information
when it comes to actual bids, when they vote on shark repellent
charter amendments there is no reason to assume that an informa-
tional disadvantage persists. Knowing the general direction of the
"I Of course, these shareholders might well prefer a plain supermajority provision. Years
ago, shark repellent amendments were of that variety and did not include any means by
which the bidder could avoid a supermajority vote. Today, however, such provisions are less
in fashion than fair price clauses. It may be that a fair price option must be attached to a
supermajority voting rule for manager-shareholders to gain the support of enough other
shareholders to amend the corporation's charter.
1987]
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effects of fair price provisions on bid premium and frequency, as
well as knowing that differences in information on bids exist across
shareholders, is equivalent to knowing the rules of the game,'126
whereas knowledge about the specific terms of transactions and
the likelihood of a competing offer is more akin to inside informa-
tion, which is created by positional advantages. It is typically as-
sumed that all players know the rules of the game, and it is realis-
tic to maintain the assumption in this context, given the publicity
that surrounds shark repellent amendments. Moreover, the most
generally accepted interpretation of stock market efficiency, that
prices reveal all publicly available information but not inside infor-
mation, supports this assumption by indicating what type of infor-
mation small shareholders can extract from stock prices.
One would accordingly expect that firms with several owners of
relatively large blocks of stock-ownership concentration in the
middle to high range-would not voluntarily adopt a fair price pro-
vision. Firms that have a large number of small shareholders and a
few medium or large investors-low ownership concentra-
tion-would be prime candidates for a successful charter amend-
ment, because a majority of the shares would be owned by the
class that benefits from a fair price rule. If the firm has a middle to
high degree of concentration, then even though there are small
shareholders who favor a fair price rule, they may not own enough
shares to be able to enact one. Finally, when there are numerous
medium sized investors and the concentration of ownership is in
the low to middle range, the voting outcome is ambiguous because
if medium sized investors are indifferent, some may join the small
shareholders and vote in favor of management's proposal, and the
amendment could pass. Table two plots a shareholder's perspective
toward a fair price provision against the firm's ownership concen-
tration using the classification of small, medium, and large share-
holders and low, middle, and high concentration. 12 7
"I The fact that information asymmetries exist is often included in the common knowl-
edge of the rules of the game.
117 I would like to thank Oliver Williamson for suggesting this table to me.
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Table two. Shareholder attitudes towards a fair price provision.
Individual Shareholder Holdings
Probable









+ = shareholder supports fair price rule
- = shareholder opposes fair price rule
0 = shareholder indifferent to fair price rule
To test this thesis, I used a simple concentration measure for the
firms in my sample, which is the ratio of the number of common
shares outstanding to the number of shareholders of record. 128 I
then performed several statistical tests to determine whether the
concentration ratios differed systematically for firms with and
without fair price provisions. The results are ambiguous. The con-
centration ratios differed systematically across states, although the
existence of fair price provisions did not: The average concentra-
tion of firms in states with second generation statutes was statisti-
cally significantly lower than that of firms in states without these
statutes. I therefore evaluated the concentration data separately
for the two groups. For the group in states with a statute, the firms
with fair price provisions had lower concentration ratios, as antici-
pated, but the difference was not statistically significant. For the
group in states without a statute, the firms with fair price provi-
sions had higher concentration ratios, but again, the difference was
not statistically significant. 2 "
123 The ownership data was obtained from Standard & Poor's New York Stock Exchange
Stock Price Reports. For firms with fair price provisions, I used the information for the date
the provision was adopted; for the remaining firms, if they were incorporated in a state with
a second generation statute, I used the date when the statute was adopted, and if they were
in a state with no statute, I used mid-1985 data, the latest time period for which I had
obtained information on the content of charters. Because the reports provide stockholder
information only after 1978, firms that had adopted fair price provisions before that year
had to be excluded from the analysis.
12, Because the firms without fair price provisions greatly outnumber the firms with fair
price provisions, I also compared the mean concentration ratios of a random set of firms in
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There is one other factor of interest that can aid in interpreting
the results. Concentration ratios and the percent of shares owned
by insiders are positively correlated in the sample, and no firms
with fair price provisions have an insider holding more than fifty
percent of the stock. I found that inside ownership differed signifi-
cantly across firms, with fair price firms having lower percentages.
The data is in keeping with the research of Cindy Alexander, who
found that the relationship between insiders' shares and
supermajority voting rules is nonlinear. 130 The thesis is that up to
around twenty percent ownership, insiders will favor such provi-
sions to obtain veto power, but as their ownership share increases
beyond that range they no longer desire a supermajority rule be-
cause it could hinder their exercise of control. Because the veto
motive is unrelated to the concerns of non-management sharehold-
ers who are considering fair price proposals, I reevaluated my data
excluding from the sample firms that had insiders with more than
twenty percent ownership. I found that in this subsample, firms
with fair price provisions had lower concentration ratios in states
with statutes, but the difference was not significant.
3. A Final Word on When Statutes Are Desirable
The ownership-concentration thesis has implications for the es-
sential question concerning second generation takeover statutes. If
a firm could voluntarily adopt a fair price provision because a ma-
jority of the shareholders would benefit from a pro rata distribu-
tion rule, then to have the provision included in its charter by stat-
which the number of firms with and without provisions was equal. In this sample, the lower
concentration ratio of firms in states with statutes was not statistically significant, and for
the aggregate group of firms, firms with fair price provisions had lower concentration ratios,
as expected, but again this difference was not significant. I compared the firms grouped by
state and found that in this sample, the results were the opposite of the more inclusive
sample: firms with fair price provisions had lower concentrations in states without statutes
and had higher concentrations in states with statutes than firms with no provisions. In both
cases the differences were, as before, insignificant.
130 See C. Alexander, Ownership Structure, Efficiency, Managerial Entrenchment, and
Antitakeover Charter Amendments 10-12 (1985) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association). My data duplicated her finding of nonlinearity; in a probit regression, with the
dichotomous dependent variable the choice of a fair price provision, the coefficients of the
independent variables of percent insider ownership and percent insider ownership squared
were respectively, positive and negative, and the asymptotic t-statistics for both were statis-
tically significant at the five percent level.
[Vol. 73:111
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ute rather than by the shareholders' vote poses no serious problem
given the conventional goal of corporation law. This does not mean
that management's support of a fair price provision is a selfless
act. Rather, it simply suggests that management's desire to pre-
serve its position by discouraging two-tier offers does not conflict
with a majority of the shareholders' wishes. In these cases, a rea-
sonable characterization is that the statute reduces the firm's
transaction costs by eliminating the need for a shareholder vote.
The finding that firms in states with statutes have lower concen-
tration ratios tends to support this transaction cost-reducing view
of the legislation, because these firms' shareholders would approve
such provisions.
The obvious problem created by the statutes is that manage-
ment may be able to circumvent a negative shareholder vote by
lobbying the state legislature. I suspect that the corporations most
active in the enactment of antitakeover legislation are those whose
ownership patterns would make it difficult to adopt a charter pro-
vision. Aetna is illustrative of the problem. Aetna has no share-
holder who owns at least five percent, although it has a substantial
number of institutional investors. Its ownership concentration,
however, is in the high range: its concentration ratio was in the top
quartile of firms in my sample no matter how I grouped firms-in
aggregate, in states with statutes, or in Connecticut alone. It there-
fore falls in the set of firms for which the voluntary adoption of a
fair price amendment by shareholder vote could be difficult.131 Al-
though this is not conclusive evidence, it is suggestive of a
managerialist explanation of the legislation.
Better evidence of whether shareholders or managers benefit
from these statutes can be produced from an event study, which
uses conventional financial econometric techniques to measure the
impact on firms' stock prices of discrete events-changes in the
information set about firms from which price expectations are
formed.13 2 If second generation takeover statutes benefit share-
holders, we should see a positive effect on stock prices when inves-
,M' The concentration ratio for the firm that was said to be behind Pennsylvania's re-
demption rights statute is, however, well below the average concentration ratio of firms in
my sample, even though it has a 24% shareholder.
132 For a summary and assessment of the methodology see Brown & Warner, Using Daily
Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1985).
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tors learn of their enactment, and conversely, if shareholders are
harmed, we should find a negative effect. I undertook such a study
for three of the statutes: Connecticut's fair price statute, Missouri's
control share acquisition statute, and Pennsylvania's redemption
rights statute.
One of the difficulties for an event study involving statutes is in
identifying which of several dates, such as the date of a bill's intro-
duction or of its approval by the legislature, is the day on which
investors became informed about the law. The power of the meth-
odology depends on accuracy in pinpointing the announcement
dates defining events. The technique assumes an efficient stock
market-investors' evaluation of a statute's impact on firms' fu-
ture cash flows is reflected in stock prices as soon as they become
informed about the law-and if the wrong date is chosen the im-
pact will not be isolated. The complication with a statute is that
the enactment date may be too late because investors may have
already learned about the legislation and assessed its likelihood of
passage, but the earlier introduction date may be an inaccurate an-
nouncement date because bill introductions typically are not publi-
cized. These limitations are not as troublesome as would appear
for the second generation takeover statutes because they have a
relatively short time span between introduction and approval-on
average, one month-and because they are virtually always en-
acted, so the amount of uncertainty that would have to be resolved
over an interval is lessened. The three statutes I examine were cho-
sen as exemplars of the three statutory patterns because they had
the shortest time spans from introduction to enactment.
Portfolios were formed of the NYSE companies incorporated in
each of the three states. The portfolios were also subdivided into
firms that had fair price provisions in their charters before their
state's second generation takeover statute was enacted and firms
that did not.133 In addition, for Pennsylvania, a third portfolio was
133 My reasons for examining the smaller portfolios as well as the aggregate portfolios are
as follows: Because not all firms are potential targets, not all firms could be expected to
experience abnormal returns upon the enactment of the legislation. Accordingly, the aggre-
gate portfolio might hide the impact of the legislation on the unidentifiable subset of future
target firms. Firms with shark repellent amendments may be more likely to be targets, com-
pared with other firms, and thus it might be useful to contrast the market reactions of the
separate portfolios. But there is a complicating offsetting factor: these firms may also gain
(or lose) less from the statute than defenseless firms because the benefit or detriment of
[Vol. 73:111
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formed consisting of the firms that had opted out of the redemp-
tion rights statute's coverage. Market-model regressions"", were
run for each of the portfolios. Two dates were used as the event
date-the date the bill was introduced" 5 and the date the state
senate approved the bill-and accordingly two regressions were
run for each portfolio. An event study for the Pennsylvania firms
that had opted out of the redemption rights statute was also per-
formed, in which opting out is the event under examination.
There were no significant effects of the statutes on stock prices
in any of the regressions. The portfolio average residuals on or
shortly after the event dates, which pick up any abnormal returns
that can be attributed to the event, were statistically insignificant
in all of the regressions. Table three shows the values of the t-
statistics for the average residuals on the event day, the day before
their self-help measures would already be reflected in their stock price. In addition, the
firms that opted out of Pennsylvania's statute might have been qualitatively different from
other firms and presumably would be expected to have been negatively affected by the
statute.
In assessing the findings concerning these various subportfolios, a further caveat is in
order. The subdivided portfolios, as well as the aggregate Connecticut and Missouri portfo-
lios, are small by conventional standards-less than 20 firms-and the power of the meth-
odology depends on having an ample-sized portfolio. To increase the size and hence the
power of the tests, I also formed portfolios that included American Stock Exchange (ASE)
firms. But because I was unable to obtain charter information on all of the ASE firms, I
could only examine the effects on aggregate portfolios. As the results did not differ signifi-
cantly from the regressions using only NYSE firms, tables 3 and 4 report only the results of
that group, because it could be subdivided.
S4 The market model is estimated using the following procedure: Ait = Rit - ai -
,6iRmt where Ait measures the abnormal return on stock i at day t, Rit is the return on
stock i at day t, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio at day t, and ai and fli are
ordinary least squares values from the estimation period, which is day -365 through day -11.
To undertake significance tests, the residuals are averaged across all the stocks in the port-
folio. See Brown & Warner, supra note 132.
M For Missouri, I used the date the bill was reported out of committee, because the bill
had been prefiled at the end of the previous session as well as revised by the committee. It
would be plausible to assume that investors would not have deemed significant any informa-
tion concerning the initial filing of the bill. Only the Pennsylvania statute's progress was
reported in the Wall Street Journal, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Bill on Dissident Stakes Clears
Legislature, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1983, at 42, col. 1; Pennsylvania Senate Is Seen Near Vote
on Bill that May Deter Dissident Investors, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1983, at 12, col. 1. The date
of the first Wall Street Journal article on Pennsylvania's statute was also used as an event
date; it produced results indistinguishable from those centered on the later date, which are
reported in tables 3 and 4. The lack of press coverage of the Connecticut and Missouri
legislation may limit the ability to attribute to investors knowledge of those statutes upon
the introduction and approval dates.
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it, and the day after it, for each portfolio.'36









































































































1s6 The t-statistic values for the average residuals of the portfolio of firms opting out of
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As reported in table four, over the period extending from ten
days before the event date to sixty days after, all portfolios cumu-
lated to a negative average residual, except for two of the Missouri
portfolios, the aggregate portfolio and the portfolio of firms with
no fair price provision, which cumulated to a positive average
residual in the regression run on the senate approval event date.137
137 One could speculate concerning why the investors in firms subject to a control share
acquisition statute appeared to be better off than those in firms subject to other variants.
The statute may have been perceived as more effective in delaying or thwarting bids, and
Takeover Statutes
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But in every case these cumulative average residuals were not sta-
tistically significant in either a three, ten, or twenty day window
around the event, or over the sixty day period following the
event.138 Moreover, when plotted over the seventy-one day inter-
val, the cumulative average residuals did not reveal any nice pat-
tern. In fact, as table four shows, in some instances the cumulative
residual immediately around the event date was positive.
The results of the study are, therefore, largely disappointing.
They do not enable one to push, even incrementally, the balance of
the debate over the efficacy of the statutes to one side or the other.
Although the insignificance of the negative residuals could be the
result of the weakness of the power of the tests, it could also be a
reflection of the assessment of investors that these three second
generation takeover statutes do not have a harmful impact on
firms.
One way to cope with concern about the desirability of takeover
statutes from the shareholders' perspective is to shift the statutory
presumption: for example, fair price legislation could have opting-
in rather than opting-out clauses. 139 This mechanism would make
shareholders desired such an impact, or it may have been viewed as clearly unconstitutional
and therefore without any effect on bids. But such speculation is foolish, as is attributing
any meaning to the difference in direction of the cumulative average residuals across the
statutes, for given the absence of statistical significance, one cannot conclude that a direc-
tional difference exists.
1 I looked at the 60-day cumulative average residual because where the event date is the
introduction date, the interval includes the enactment date and thus contains the resolution
of uncertainty concerning passage, although it also necessarily includes noise. The cumula-
tive residuals of the firms that opted out of Pennsylvania's statute were no different from
those of the other firms, although we might have expected them to be strongly negative
given management's subsequent decision. Opting out similarly had little impact on firms.
Although the residuals at or just before this event are positive, as is the cumulative average
residual for the three days centered on the event, over the longer 71 day interval of 10 days
before and 60 days after, as well as over shorter windows of 2, 3, 10, and 20 days, they
cumulate to an insignificant negative amount. The cumulative average residuals of the event
study of the firms opting out from the Pennsylvania statute were (t-statistic in
parentheses):
day -10 to +60 -. 0028
day - 5 to + 5 -. 0207 (-.7164)
day - 1 to + 1 .0085 (.5645)
day - 1 to 0 .0131 (1.0659)
day 0 to + 1 -. 0069 (-.5564)
day -10 to +10 -. 0121 (-.3034)
1M9 Ronald Gilson has also advocated such an approach. See R. Gilson, The Law and Fi-
nance of Corporate Acquisitions 1078 (1986). Two of the 21 states with second generation
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it more difficult for management to undermine shareholders' pref-
erences by lobbying state legislators inasmuch as the shareholders
would still have to endorse the rule. This tactic is not new in cor-
porate law. Familiar examples of statutes that vary across states
according to whether they presume the existence of a right or re-
quire the right to be expressly acknowledged in a charter are cu-
mulative voting and preemptive rights provisions.
A shift in presumption for fair price statutes could make it eas-
ier for corporation codes to mirror shareholder sentiment. This is
because the costs to shareholders of opting in and opting out are
not symmetrical. Large shareholders and institutions might be able
to block the adoption of a charter amendment-the opt-in proce-
dure-by voting against management's proposal, because in public
corporations as many as twenty percent of the shares do not vote.
Yet it might be prohibitively expensive for the same shareholders
to have included in the proxy agenda, against management's
wishes, a proposal to exclude the firm from a statute's cover-
age-the opt-out procedure-and in this case the presence of non-
voting shares will cut against the shareholder. 140 Changing the pre-
sumption of coverage, however, would be a mixed blessing: it
would eliminate the reduction in transaction costs, which is the
benefit of having a statute, for those firms whose shareholders
would approve a shark repellent provision. Before endorsing the
opt-in approach, therefore, it is necessary to know the number of
firms in each category so that the direction in which one wishes to
err can be sensibly determined.14 1
IV. CONCLUSION
On examining the politics that produced the second generation
takeover statute in Connecticut, I found only corporations and
statutes have such a presumption, but in one the opt-in procedure is fulfilled by a provision
in the corporate bylaws rather than by charter amendment. See Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-
235(a) (Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987) (switching from
opt-out to opt-in regime).
40 An additional problem is that in many states shareholders cannot propose charter
amendments on their own. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1983).
14 An alternative approach that retains the transaction-cost-reducing benefit would be to
maintain the opt-out procedure but to allow a simple majority or some lower percent-
age-rather than a supermajority-vote of shareholders to exempt the firm from a statute's
coverage.
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their lobbying organizations involved in the statute's passage. I
could not identify any other groups who supported the legislation
or who even perceived it to be in their interest. I also could not
locate any evidence that the politics behind similar statutes in
other states differed dramatically from Connecticut's. The best ex-
planation of the political dynamics is that legislators are reacting
to the immediate pressure of a firm in a situation in which support
for the bill entails no discernible political cost.
This led me to direct my attention to the shareholder-manager
and shareholder-shareholder nexus, for these are the relationships
implicated by the statutes' politics. The expedited enactment of
Connecticut's takeover law does not provide much information
concerning who within the firm is the beneficiary of the legislation.
Accordingly, I examined the effects of the different variants of
takeover statutes on shareholder decisions to tender. I found that a
fair price provision may result in shareholders tendering less fre-
quently than a control share acquisition statute or no statute at all,
but more frequently than a redemption rights provision. Given the
interaction between a shareholder's desire to receive a higher pre-
mium and the desire to receive bids in the first place, a fair price
provision may be the most popular shark repellent amendment
and statute because, unlike other devices, it provides balance be-
tween these two concerns.
But not all firms adopt fair price provisions. I therefore sought
to explore when shareholders would voluntarily desire fair price
protection, and what the dynamics of self-help decisions could sug-
gest concerning the demand for statutes. In contrast to the now-
standard criticism of shark repellent charter provisions, a story can
be developed based on differential information costs in which it is
to the benefit of some, but not all, shareholders to adopt a fair
price provision. This implies that only firms with specific owner-
ship structures-in particular, low concentrations of stock owner-
ship-will voluntarily adopt such provisions. Although the empiri-
cal evidence is ambiguous, even assuming this story is correct, it
still does not provide a clear answer to the question of why a stat-
ute is necessary to codify the provisions. All that I can assert with
confidence is that a statute impacts differentially on firms. For
many firms to which they apply, these are surely transaction-cost-
reducing laws. But there will be situations in which second genera-
tion statutes enable managers to act in ways that a majority of
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their shareholders would not approve,"" and firms fitting into this
group may well be the impetus behind the enactment of legisla-
tion. Given the conventional goal of corporate law, in which firms
are to be run in the shareholders' interest, this consequence of
takeover statutes-that they can undermine the sovereignty of
shareholder decisions-should be cause for serious concern.
One further conclusion we can draw from the politics in Con-
necticut is that the regulation of corporations at the state level is
not an unmitigated good. States in which there are not many major
corporations, particularly where there are few acquirers, are more
susceptible to the pressure of a specific target firm and hence are
more likely to pass takeover regulations, which may have as the
object entrenching the firm's management. In Delaware, no one
firm can have the influence on the state legislature that Aetna has
in Connecticut because so many more firms are incorporated in
Delaware. In addition, Delaware's clientele is far more varied than
that of a smaller state, which may have no acquiring firms and
only a few targets. It is instructive that Delaware has been slow to
move in the area of takeover regulation and instead requires share-
holder approval for what other states are now starting to mandate:
firms can opt in to fair price and other forms of protection by
amending their charters. Thus Delaware's regime relies more heav-
ily on the revealed preferences of shareholders. In the takeover
game, where managers' and shareholders' interests can often col-
lide, such that managers may seek to exert influence on legisla-
tures in ways detrimental to shareholders, we may well have the
least to fear in Delaware.
Given the persistent support across the states for takeover regu-
lation, a reasonable forecast is that if-or as-new statutes are
struck down by courts, different and more creative variations will
be devised. Moreover, regulation of takeovers will not end even if
state action is held to be preempted by the Williams Act. Rather,
the political forum will shift from the state legislatures to Con-
gress. What precise course of action Congress will follow is impos-
sible to predict. But when the corporations and business groups
that demanded these laws at the state level concentrate their ef-
forts on Congress, they may well succeed.
142 I leave for subsequent work the important question concerning the use of majority rule
when not all shareholders have the same interest.
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APPENDIX
This appendix presents the calculation of the expected values
used to rollback through the decision trees in figures 1-8. For con-
venience, the definitions of variables and assumptions concerning
the relationships between variables stated in the text, are repro-
duced below.
Definitions
X, = price per share of first-tier tender offer
X2 = price per share in second-tier merger
M, = market price per share after a successful bid
M, = market price per share if the bid fails and there is
no subsequent bid
X3 = price offered by a competing bidder if the bid fails
p = the probability the tender offer succeeds
a = the probability that the tender offer fails and
there is no second bid
2a = the probability that the tender offer fails and
there is a second bid
q = the probability the merger is approved when there
is a fair price provision
r = the probability that the merger is rejected when
there is a fair price provision and the bidder takes
no further action
s = the probability that the merger is rejected when
there is a fair price provision and the bidder pays
the required price, X1, to complete the transaction
h = the probability an appraisal court will value a dis-
senter's shares at M2
(1-h) = the probability an appraisal court will value a dis-
senter's shares at X,
n = of the amount by which the probability of the
merger's rejection is increased when a shareholder
votes no to the merger and the vote matters, the
proportion that goes to increasing r.
Note: for several calculations the definition of a probability is
used, in particular, that s + r + q = 1.
[Vol. 73:111
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Assumptions.
(0-a) M2 < X2 < XI
(0-b) M1 < XI < X 3
(1) M2 = .59X1
(2) X2 = .86X,
(3) M1 = .61X,
(4) X, = 1.17X,
A. Decision with no shark repellent provision (figure 1).
1. Decision at node 2:
(a) h = 1 (no exercise of appraisal rights)
X 2 > M2  (0-a)
Decision rule: vote yes
(b) 0 : h - 1
X2  hM2 + (1-h)Xl
.86X 2 h(.59X,) + (1-h)X, (1,2)
h .34
Decision rule: h > .34, vote yes
h < .34, vote no
2. Decision at node 1:
(a) h > .34 (vote yes)
(p+2a)X + aM, pX2 + aM + 2aX3
(p+2a)X, .86pX + 1.17(2a)X, (2,3,4)
.14p -. 34a
Decision rule: p > .34a/.14, tender shares
Note: Because a = (1-p)/3, this decision rule reduces to tender
ifp > .447.
(b) h < .34 (vote no)
(p+2a)X, + aM, < phM2 + p(1-h)X, + aM, + 2aX3
pX1  .59phX, + p(1-h)X, + .34aX,
p .34a + .59ph -ph + p
.4lph .34a
Decision rule: ph > .83a, tender shares
Note: Rearranging terms, we consider p 2 .34a/.41h. The de-
nominator will be less than the denominator in A.L.(a), so p must
be greater than a larger number when the shareholder would vote
no to get him to tender.
19871
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3. Decision recognizing blended premium:
If bid and merger are successful the tendering shareholder re-
ceives per share: .5X 1 + .5X 2 = .93X, (2)
(a) h > .34 (vote yes)
(p+2a)(.5)X, + aM + p(.5)X2 ; pX, + aM + 2aX
a + .93p 2.34a + .86p
.07p - 1.34a
p .86
Decision rule: p > .86, tender shares
(b) h < .34 (vote no)
(p+2a)(.5)X, + .5 { phM2 + p(1-h)X1 + aM,
-phM + p(1-h)X, + aM, + 2aX3
.5p ± a- .5ph(.59) + .5p(1-h) + 2.34a
.205ph - 1.34a
ph 2: 1.34a/.205
Decision rule: ph > 1.34a/.205, tender
Note: in both of these blended premium cases, the cutoff for
tendering is higher than the cutoff when the blending is not
recognized.
B. Decision when there is a fair price rule (figure 2).
1. Decision at node 2:qX, + rM, + sX, q {hM2 + (1-h)X, I + rM. + sX
.86 .59h + 1-h (1,2)
.41h >.14
Decision rule: h > .34, vote yes
h < .34, vote no
Note: this decision is unchanged from the decision with no
shark repellent amendment.
2. Decision at node 1:
(a) h > .34 (vote yes)
(p+2a)X, + aM 1 2 p I qX, + rM2 + sX, } + aM +
2aX3
p + 2a <2: 2.34a + p(.86q + .59r + s) (1,2)
p - .34a/(1-.86q-.59r-s)
Decision rule: p > .34a/(1-.86q-.59r-s), tender
Note: If 1-.86q-.59r-s = .14, or substituting, q + 2.9r = 1, then
a fair price rule has no effect on decision to tender. Rearranging
[Vol. 73:111
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and substituting terms, if 1.9r < s, (r < .53s), the shareholder ten-
ders less frequently with a fair price rule.
(b) h < .34 (vote no)
(p+2a)X +aM, p { rM2 + sX1 + qhM2 + q(1-h)X } +
aM, + 2aX3
p 3 .34a/(1 -.59r -s -q +.41qh)
p .34a/(.41r + .41qh) (substitution)
Decision rule: p > .34a/(1-.59r-s-q+.41qh), tender
Note: If r/(1-q) = h, then a fair price rule has no effect on de-
cision to tender. Rearranging and substituting terms, if r < sh/
(1-h), the shareholder tenders less frequently with a fair price rule.
3. Decision where vote affects merger outcome (figure 3).
Here we assume if the shareholder votes no, q = 0, and if he
votes yes q = 1. For technical convenience, for the outcomes when
the vote is no, I write the probability of receiving M2 as r +nq and
of receiving X1 as s + (1-n)q.
(a) Decision at node 2:
X2 (r+nq)M2 + { s+(1-n)q } X,
.86 .59r + .59nq + s + q - nq
.27 5 .41s + .41q - .41nq
nq < .34 - r
<Decision rule: nq > .34-r, vote yes
nq < .34-r, vote no
(b) Decision at node 1:
1. nq > .34-r (vote yes)
We note that this is the same tree as decision A.2.(a) (figure 1),
and we have the same rule as with no provision.
2. nq < .34-r (vote no)
(p+2a)X +aM, . p(r+nq)M2 + p I s+(1-n)q } X, +
aM1 + 2aX3
p .34a + ps + pq - pnq + .59pr + .59pnq
p _ .34a + p(.59r + s + q - .41nq)
p .34a/(1-s-q-.59r+.41nq)
< Decision rule: p > .34a/(.41r + .41nq), tender
Note: There will be no effect on the decision with the rule if
r + nq = h.
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C. Decision with truncated tree, only node 2.
1. If no fair price rule, compare:
X, hM2 + (1-h)X,
2. If fair price rule, compare:
qX2 + rM2 + sX1  qhM2 + q(1-h)X, + rM2 + sX,
Compare results with and without rule:
(a) vote yes
X 2, qX2 + rM2 + sX1
.86 .86q + s + .59r
-.14 !-.14q- .41r
Note: If .14q + .41r > .14, the expected value is greater with a
fair price rule.
(b) vote no
hM2 + (1-h)X ; qhM, + q(1-h)X1 + rM + sX,
.59h + 1 - h .59qh + q - qh + .59r + s
-.41h< -.41r - .41qh
r h(1-q)
h r/(1-q)
Note: The expected value with a fair price rule is greater when
r/(1-q) > h.
D. Decision when there is a supermajority provision (figure 5).
1. Decision at node 2:
qX2 + (1-q)M2  hM2 + (1-h)X,
.86q + .59(1-q) ; .59h + 1- h
.27q 2 .41 - .41h
h ; 1-.65q = r + s + .35q
Decision rule: h > 1 -.65q, vote yes
h < 1 -.65q, vote no
2. Decision at node 1:
(a) h > 1 -.65q (vote yes)
(p+2a)X- + aM > pqX2 + p(1-q)M 2 + aM1 + 2aX3
p .34a + .86pq + .59p - .59pq
.41p k .34a + .27pq
Decision rule: p > .34a/(.41-.27q), tender
Note: This cutoff value for p is smaller than the cutoff value
when there is- a fair price provision. To see this we compare:
.41-.27q to 1-.86q-.59r-s.
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Substituting and rearranging terms this simplifies to
.59r + .59q + s ; .59, or 1.6s > s.
If .41 -.27q < .14, the cutoff value for p will be smaller with a
supermajority provision than the cutoff value with no shark repel-
lent provision.
(b) h < 1-.65q (vote no)
We note that this decision problem is the same as the tree in
figure 1 with no shark repellent amendment and we get the same
decision rule as in A.2.(b), tender if .4lph > .34a.
3. Decision if vote affects merger outcome (figure 4):
(a) Decision at node 2:
X, > M,
Decision rule: always vote yes
(b) Decision at node 1:
(p+2a)X, + aM, 2 pX2 + aM, + 2aX
We note that this decision is the same as the decision in A.2.(a),
voting yes with no shark repellent amendment, and we get the
same rule, tender if .14p > .34a.
E. Decision when there is a redemption rights rule (figure 6).
1. Decision at node 2:
X1 > hM2 + (1-h)X,
Decision rule: always exercise redemption rights
against bidder
2. Decision at node 1:
(p+2a)X, + aM1 . pX1 + aM1 + 2aX3
p + 2a p + 2.34a
p < p + .34a
Decision rule: always do not tender
Note: In figure 6a, the two-step acquisition with a redemption
rights provision, the decision at node 3 is always exercise redemp-
tion rights against the bidder rather than go to court, and because
X2 < XL, the decision at node 2 is always vote no to the second
step acquisition in order to exercise the redemption right. Because
(p+2a)X, + aM, < pX, + aM1 + 2aX3 , as before, the decision
rule is always do not tender.
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F. Decision when there is a control share acquisition rule (figures
7-8).
1. Decision when vote has no affect on outcome:
(a) No appraisal rights (figure 7a):
pX + aM1 + 2aX3 -: pM2 + aM1 + 2aX
Decision rule: always vote yes
(b) Appraisal rights (figure 7):
pX1 + aM1 + 2aX3 < phM2 + p(1-h)X1 + aM1 + 2aX3
p : p-ph + .59ph
0 > -.41ph
Decision rule: always vote yes
Note: In figure 7b, the two step acquisition with a control share
acquisition rule with appraisal rights, the shareholder always votes
no at node 2 because,
qX2 + (1-q)M 2  hM 2 + (1-h)X 1
.86q + .59(1-q) .59h + (1-h)
.41h .41 + .14q
h < 1 + .34q.
But he always votes yes at node 1 because X1 > hM2 + (1-h)X. If
there are no appraisal rights, the end result is still the same; al-
though the shareholder now votes yes at node 2 because
qX, + (1-q)M 2 > M 2, he still always votes yes at node 1 because
X. > qX2 + (1-q)M2.
2. Decision when vote affects outcome (figure 8):
If the vote is yes, p = 1. Here we assume that if the vote is no,
p = 0, and the change in probability is distributed between the
two results of a bid's failure, receiving X3 or M1. For technical con-
venience I first allocate the increased probability proportionately,
adding 2p/3 and lp/3 respectively. I then relax this assumption
and add np and (1-n)p respectively to those outcomes.
(a) proportional adjustment in probabilities:
X, (a+p/3)M1 + (2a+2p/3)X3
1 .61a + .61p/3 + 2.34a + 2.34p/3
1 2.95a + 2.95p/3
.338 a + p/3
.338 > .333 (substitution)
Decision rule: always vote yes
(b) general adjustment in probabilities:
Xl,;< (a+np)M, + { 2a + p(1-n) } X
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1 .61a + .61np + 2.34a + 1.17p - 1.17np
.05a ; .17p - .56np (substitution)
p -.0166/(.56n -.1866) (substitution)
Decision rule: p > -.0166/(.56n-.1866), vote yes
Note: If n > .333, this reduces to p > 0, and the rule is always
vote yes.
G. Decisions if appraisal court awards X3 with probability (1-h)
rather than X1.
1. No shark repellent provision:
(a) Decision at node 2:
X2 ! hM2 + (l-h)X3
.86 .59h + 1.17(1-h)
h .53
Decision rule: h > .53, vote yes
h < .53, vote no
Note: The shareholder votes no more frequently than before
because .53 > .34.
(b) Decision at node 1, h < .53, vote no:
(p+2a)X, + aM, phM2 + p(1-h)X3 + aM1 + 2aX3
p + 2a 2.34a + .59ph + 1.17p - 1.17ph
.58ph; .34a + .17p
ph (.34a +.17p)/.58
Decision rule: ph > (.34a +.17p)/.58, tender
Note: When (.34a + .17p)/.58 > .34a/.41, the shareholder ten-
ders less frequently when the maximum appraisal value is X. than
when it is X. When they are equal, the decision is unaffected.
2. Fair price rule:
(a) Decision at node 2:
Same as G.1(a)
(b) Decision at node 1, h < .53 (vote no):
(p+2a)X, +aM 1 : p { qhM2 + (1-h)qX3 +rM2 + sX, } +
aM1 + 2aX3
2a + p 2.34a + p(.59qh + 1.17q -1.17qh +.59r + s)
p = .34a/(1- .59r -1.17q -s +.58qh)Decision rule: p > .34a/(1-.59r-1.17q-s+.58qh),
tender
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Note: The possibility of receiving the higher appraisal value
has no effect on the decision to tender if h = 1. Since h > 1 is not
possible, the shareholder tenders less frequently when the court
may award X. instead of X.
3. Fair price rule, decision affects merger outcome:
Note: Changing the maximum received in appraisal does not
affect this decision because if the shareholder votes no the merger
does not succeed and there will be no appraisal proceeding.
4. Supermajority rule:
(a) Decision at node 2:
qX, + (1-q)M 2  hM, + (1-h)X
.86q + .59 - 59q - .59h + 1.17 - 1.17h
.27q + .58h .58
h 1 -.46q
Decision rule: h > 1 -.46q, vote yes
h < 1 -.46q, vote no
Note: The shareholder votes no more frequently than before
because 1-.46q > 1-.65q. The shareholder votes no more fre-
quently than he does under a fair price provision when
1-.46q > .53, that is, when .98 > q.
(b) Decision at node 1, h < 1 -.46q (vote no):
(p+2a)X, + aM, < phM + p(1-h)X3 + aM + 2aX3
Note: This decision problem is the same as G.1.
5. Supermajority rule, decision affects merger outcome:
Same as G.3.
6. Redemption rights rule:
X : hM2 + (1-h)X 3
1 .59h + 1.17(1-h)
.58h z .17
h 3 .29
Decision rule: h > .29, exercise redemption rights
h < .29, go to appraisal court
Note: The shareholder still always does not tender because
(2a+p)X, + aM, < p I hM2 + (1-h)X } + aM + 2aX, and
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(2a+p)X, + aM1 < pX, + aM1 + 2aX3.
7. Control share acquisition rule:
pX, + aM1 + 2aX 3 : phM 2 + pX - phX, + aM + 2aX.
1 .59h + 1.17 - 1.17h
h .29 Decision rule: h > .29, vote yes
h < .29, vote no
Note: Now the shareholder does not always vote yes.
8. Control share acquisition rule, decision affects outcome:
Same as G.3.
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